TRUSTS: Scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 3, Issue , 2012, Pages 2348-2355

  Yin, Zhengyu ^a   Jiang, Albert Xin ^a   Johnson, Matthew P ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a   Kiekintveld, Christopher ^b   Leyton Brown, Kevin ^c   Sandholm, Tuomas ^d   Sullivan, John P ^e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^d CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COUNTER TERRORISM; LEADER-FOLLOWER; LOS ANGELES; METRO RAIL SYSTEM; SPATIAL CONSTRAINTS; STACKELBERG; STACKELBERG GAMES; TRANSIT SYSTEMS;

ALGORITHMS; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; INSPECTION; SCHEDULING;

MASS TRANSPORTATION;

EID: 84868295022     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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