State identity, continuity, and responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian genocide

European Journal of International Law

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 797-820

  Avedian, Vahagn ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867757443     PISSN: 09385428     EISSN: 14643596     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chs056     Document Type: Article

References (96)

1. Sveriges Riksdag, Kammarens protokoll: Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:86, Stockholm, 11 Mar. 2010.
2. Sveriges Riksdag, Motion 2008/09:U332: Folkmordet 1915 på armenier, assyrier/syrianer/kaldéer och pontiska greker, Stockholm, 7 Oct. 2008.
3. Among others see an answer from Foreign Minister Carl Bildt to Cecilia Wikström (Liberal party), Svar på skriftlig fråga 2008/09:891, Swedish Parliament, Stockholm, 13 May 2009.
4. For an example in the Swedish discussion see Ünsal, 'Sahlins svek mot oss turkar en seger för Alliansen', in Newsmill, Stockholm, 13 Mar. 2010, available at: www.newsmill.se/artikel/2010/03/13/v-nsternforts-tter-att-sabba-f-r-sverige.
5. It is, however, noteworthy that this discontinuity seems to be limited to the state alone, while the cultural, social, and historical continuity (with the obvious exception of World War I and the period prior to it) is embraced openly. Among others see Karpat, 'Introduction', in K.H. Karpat (ed.), Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey (2000), at pp. ix, x, xvii.
6. Magnusson, 'Holocaust and Genocide Studies: Survey of Previous Research', Research Agenda, The Uppsala Programme for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Uppsala, 1999, at 24-26.
7. Katz, 'The Uniqueness of the Holocaust.
8. The Historical Dimension', in A.S. Rosenbaum (ed.), Is the Holocaust Unique? (1996).
9. For Dawidowicz see P. Novick, The Holocaust in the American Life (1999).
10. R.F. Melson, Revolution and Genocide, On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust (1992).
11. For a scholarly view see the resolutions by the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), 'About Us' Resolutions and Statements, available at: www.genocidescholars.org/about-us/statements-resolutions.
12. For a strictly legal analysis concluding that the events were a case of genocide see The International Center of Transitional Justice, The Applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to Events which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century: Legal Analysis Prepared for the International Center for Transitional Justice (2002), available at: www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Turkey-Armenian-Reconciliation-2002-English.pdf.
13. See Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, 'Professional Ethics and the Denial of Armenian Genocide', in 9 Holocaust & Genocide Studies (1995) 1.
14. V.N. Dadrian, The Key Elements in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and Falsification (1999).
15. Craven, 'The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law', 9 EJIL (1998) 153.
16. K. Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law (1968), at 5.
17. See also J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2007), at 678-679.
18. D. O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal and International Law (1967), i, at 26-27.
19. K.G. Bühler, State Succession and Membership in International Organizations: Legal Treaties versus Political Pragmatism (2001), at 14.
20. R. Müllerson, International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS (1994), at 139.
21. The same comparison between predecessor and successor can be applied to Austria and Hungary after the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy in the wake of World War I.
22. See P. Dumberry, State Succession to International Responsibility (2007), at 99-102.
23. See also Walker, 'Turkey's Imperial Legacy: Understanding Contemporary Turkey through its Ottoman Past', 8 Perspectives on Global Development and Technology (2009) 498.
24. For a definition of international crimes and internationally wrongful acts see Bowett, 'Crimes of State and the 1996 Report of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility', 9 EJIL (1998) 164.
25. Also see J. Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002), at 196.
26. Crawford, 'Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility', 10 EJIL (1999) 450.
27. Silvanie, 'Responsibility of States for Acts of Insurgent Governments', 33 AJIL (1939) 78, at 80-81.
28. The skilful manoeuvres of Mustafa Kemal managed to play the Major Powers, in particular the USA, Britain, and France, against each other and use their eagerness to divide the Turkish Empire's vast oil and mineral assets, as well as new investment opportunities in the emerging Turkey.
29. Among others see P. Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response (2003), at 363-372.
30. C. Simpson, The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law, and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (1995), at 32-33.
31. Bloxham, 'The Roots of American Genocide Denial: Near Eastern Geopolitics and the Interwar Armenian Question', 8 J Genocide Research (2006) 27.
32. See also R.H. Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West (1990), at 207.
33. Noyes and Smith, 'State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and Several Liability', 13 Yale J Int'l L (1988) 238.
34. E.J. Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: The Rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1925-1926 (1984), at 106.
35. On the subject of Armenian Genocide specifically see, e.g., Akçam, 'Anatomy of a Crime: the Turkish Historical Society's Manipulation of Archival Documents', 7 J Genocide Research (2005) 255.
36. For an overview of modern Turkish historiography see Bloxham and Müge Göçek, 'The Armenian Genocide', in D. Stone (ed.), The Historiography of Genocide (2008), at 344.
37. E.J. Zürcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party 1924-1925 (1991), at 1-2.
38. See also D. Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (2005), at 213-214.
39. Another aspect of this retouching is erasing Armenian presence from the Armenian Highland and Asia Minor.
40. For an overview of the Istanbul, Yozgat, and Trabizon trials see V.N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (2004), at 317-336.
41. See H. Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (1997), at 103.
42. R.H. Davison, Turkey: The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective (1968), at 136.
43. Akçam, A Shameful Act, The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (2006), at 306.
44. See also Üngör, 'Seeing like a Nation-state: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913-1950', 10 J Genocide Research (2008) 28.
45. Çetingolu, 'Ittihat ve Terakki'den Kemalizm'e kardrolar', in R. Zarakolu (ed.), Resmi Tarih Tartismalari - 3 Ittathiciliktan Kemalizme (2007), at 2.
46. The Millî Kongre (National Congress) of 29 Nov. 1918 was the first united front for the Nationalist movement, dominated by Unionist organizations.
47. This dissociation also made Mustafa Kemal, quite well known within the circle of CUP officers, a suitable choice for the leader of the Nationalist movement.
48. See also Çetinoglu, 'Teskilat-I Mahsusa'dan Kemalist Rejime Gelen Kadrolar Üzerine Bir Deneme', unpublished paper (2006), at 4.
49. Correspondence between Cemal Pasha and Kemal after World War I shows that he too supported Kemal and the nationalists and did try to cooperate with them.
50. Karakol used a wide network within the old institutions and organizations. According to British Intelligence reports, Hilâli Ahmar (the 'Red Crescent') was used by Karakol as 'a channel for clandestine payments and as a means to communicate with Unionists in foreign countries (by special cipher in possession of Dr. Adnan)', while Türk Ocâgi ('Turkish Heart'), created by students of the Military Medical Academy, with Pan Turkish ideology, among others campaigning for 'buy Turkish'.
51. Astourian, 'Modern Turkish Identity and the Armenian Genocide', in R.G. Hovannisian (ed.), Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide (1999), at 35-38.
52. A report from the Swedish Embassy in Constantinople confirms the policy of strengthening the Turkish middle class by simply eliminating the Greek and Armenian merchants and bankers who controlled these circles.
53. See Avedian, 'The Armenian Genocide 1915: From a Neutral Small State's Perspective: Sweden', Unpublished Master's degree paper, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 2009, at 52, available at: www.armenica.org/material.
54. Dadrian, 'The Role of the Special Organisation in the Armenian Genocide during the First World War', in P. Payani, Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars (1993), at 50.
55. A. Alvarez, Governments, Citizens, and Genocide. A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach (2001), at 93.
56. M. Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (2005), at 164-166.
57. For the Lausanne Treaty see World War I Document Archive, Treaty of Lausanne, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Utah, available at: wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne.
58. For the Sèvres Treaty see World War I Document Archive, Treaty of Sèvres, 1920, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Utah; available at: wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Peace_Treaty_of_Sevres.
59. Kemal signed the death 'sentences the same day they were pronounced and they were executed that same night in Ankara'.
60. Abolishing the Caliphate on 3 Mar. 1924 could also be seen as an elimination of a potential competitor to the power, since the Caliph would be the highest religious authority, not only in Turkey but in the all Islamic world, thus an authority with which to reckon.
61. H. Pasdermadjian, Histoire de l'Arménie depuis les origines jusqu'au traité de Lausanne (1949), at 498.
62. For the treatment of the Armenian soldiers see R.P. Adalian, Remembering and Understanding the Armenian Genocide (1995), at 17.
63. A. Jones, Genocide, A Comprehensive Introduction (2006), at 106.
64. E.D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide, Utopia of Race and Nation (2003), at 4-5.
65. See also Reid, '"Genocide in the 20th Century": The Concept of War and Genocidal Impulses in the Ottoman Empire, 1821-1918', 4 Holocaust & Genocide Studies (1989) 175.
66. See also R. Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923 (2009), at 45-46.
67. Note that this substantial sum was that of 1922. A rough estimate would be an increase by a factor of 13.70, i.e., $50.67 billion in 2012.
68. See, e.g., US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, CPI Inflation Calculator; avaialble at: www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
69. This could be compared with the US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission's decision that 'G.D.R. should be responsible for the illegal taking of property committed by the Soviet Union during its military occupation of East Germany (1945-1949) since the Soviet expropriations "were subsequently ratified by [the] G.D.R. after its establishment in 1949"'.
70. This group of people enriched by confiscated Armenian property has given rise to the common Turkish saying tehcir zenginleri, the 'barons of deportation'.
71. See also V. Teghiayan, Malta belgeleri, Ingiltere Disisleri Bakanligi "Turk Savas Suclulari" Dosyasi (2007), at 3, available at: www.kitapdenizi.com/kitap/18550-Malta-Belgeleri-Ingiltere-Disisleri-Bakanligi-Turk-Savas-Suclulari-Dosyasi-kitabi.aspx.
72. R.G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918 (1967), at 52.
73. Lauren, 'From Impunity to Accountability: Forces of Transformation and the Changing International Human Rights Context', in R. Thakur and P. Malcontent (eds), From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (2004), at 22-25.
74. World War I Document Archive, 2007, Treaty of Sèvres, 1920.
75. See also Schwelb, 'Crimes Against Humanity', BYBIL (1946) 179.
76. Segesser, 'Dissolve or Punish? The International Debate Amongst Jurists and Publicists on the Consequences of the Armenian Genocide for the Ottoman Empire,1915-23',10 J Genocide Research (2008) 97.
77. For a commission report on charges with regard to 'Violations of the Laws and Customs of War' see Adatci, 'Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference', 14 AJIL (1920) 114.
78. See also Hudson, 'The First Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice', 17 AJIL (1923) 17.
79. Bloxham and Göçek put the number of Muslim victims killed in Armenian atrocities at 40,000-60,000, which became one of the central arguments in the Republic's narrative to counter the 1915 massacres.
80. Kramer, 'The First Wave of International War Crimes Trials: Istanbul and Leipzig', 14 European Rev (2006) 443.
81. Akçam points out that '[a]ttacks on the government had no validity unless proof was provided. In its absence, the government continued to deny culpability.'
82. The list of the Unionists, wanted war criminals, etc., is far too long to be set out here. A few names that could be mentioned as examples are: Mazhar Müfit, Unionist provincial administrator, Vali of Bitlis in 1919, wanted for war crimes and Armenian massacres, later member of the provincial government in Ankara, member of the National Assembly.
83. Küçük Kâzim, Unionist fedaî in Tashkilati Mahsusa, deeply involved in the Armenian massacres.
84. Halis Turgut, wanted for crimes against Armenians; Topal Osman Aga, a member of the Teshkilati Mahsusa, wanted for his role in the Armenian massacres, later head of Mustafa Kemal's bodyguards.
85. See also Dadrian, 'The Turkish Military Tribunal's Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major Court-Martial Series', 11 Holocaust & Genocide Studies (1997) 28.
86. Kemal Bey, the prefect of Bogazliyan, was found guilty of war crimes and involvement in the Armenian massacres, and executed on 10 Apr. 1919. However, his funeral ceremony turned into a celebration of him as 'the Great Martyr of the Turks'.
87. Talaat's wife was receiving a salary for 'services to the fatherland'. The same applied to the members of Teshkilati Mahsusa and even the daughter of Kemal's arch-rival, Enver.
88. Cemal's remains were buried in Turkey in Sept. 1920, while Talaat's remains were moved from Berlin in 1943 and received state burial in Turkey. It is noteworthy that the remains of Enver, the only true threat to Kemal's authority within the national movement, are still buried somewhere in Central Asia.
89. Regarding the identification of this threat as a major concern see B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (1961), at 356.
90. These are the numbers mentioned in Soviet sources, while some estimate that the loss was in reality closer to 300,000 people.
91. For the genocide against Anatolian and Pontic Greeks see M. D. Peterson, 'Starving Armenians': America and the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1930 and After (2004).
92. C.G. Hatzidimitriou, American Accounts Documenting the Destruction of Smyrna by the Kemalist Turkish Forces: September 1922 (2005).
93. C. Fotiadis, The Genocide of Greeks of Pontus (2002-2006), 14 vols.
94. For the impact on the Assyrian/Syrian population see D. Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia During World War I (2006).
95. It must be remembered that this statement should be seen in the context of the racial views which dominated Europe during this period. Notwithstanding that, this is illustrative of the continuation of the same Unionist attitude and reasoning which resulted in the Armenian Genocide during World War I.
96. Another would be a remark on the Turkish-Greek population exchange.