Endogenous market segmentation for lemons

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 562-576

  Kim, Kyungmin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867669864     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: 17562171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00186.x     Document Type: Article

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