The economics of tacit collusion: Implications for merger control

Contributions to Economic Analysis

Volumn 282, Issue , 2007, Pages 217-239

  Ivaldi, Marc ^a   Jullien, Bruno ^a   Rey, Patrick ^a   Seabright, Paul ^a   Tirole, Jean ^a  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867661369     PISSN: 05738555     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82008-0     Document Type: Review

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