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Volumn 66, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 971-991

Resale markets and the assignment of property rights

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EID: 0001740609     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00116     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (41)

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  • 7
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    • Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
    • GALE, D. (1986), "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization", Econometrica, 54, 785-806.
    • (1986) Econometrica , vol.54 , pp. 785-806
    • Gale, D.1
  • 8
    • 0347138196 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • On the Efficiency of Decentralized Exchange with Resale Possibilities
    • GROES, E. and TRANAES, T. (1999), "On the Efficiency of Decentralized Exchange with Resale Possibilities", International Economic Review, 40, 423-439.
    • (1999) International Economic Review , vol.40 , pp. 423-439
    • Groes, E.1    Tranaes, T.2
  • 9
    • 84936194550 scopus 로고
    • The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
    • GROSSMAN, S. and HART, O. (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: a Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719.
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  • 10
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    • Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture
    • GUL, F., SONNENSCHEIN, H. and WILSON, R. (1986), "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture", Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 155-190.
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    • Gul, F.1    Sonnenschein, H.2    Wilson, R.3
  • 11
    • 0002878572 scopus 로고
    • Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value
    • GUL, F. (1989), "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value", Econometrica, 57, 81-95.
    • (1989) Econometrica , vol.57 , pp. 81-95
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  • 12
    • 84934453985 scopus 로고
    • Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
    • HART, O. and MOORE, J. (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1119-1115.
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  • 13
    • 0011602778 scopus 로고
    • Cyclical Delay in Infinite Horizon Bargaining with Externalities
    • JEHIEL, P. and MOLDOVANU, B. (1995), "Cyclical Delay in Infinite Horizon Bargaining with Externalities", Review of Economic Studies, 62, 619-639.
    • (1995) Review of Economic Studies , vol.62 , pp. 619-639
    • Jehiel, P.1    Moldovanu, B.2
  • 15
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    • The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
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    • Laffont, J.J.1    Tirole, J.2
  • 21
    • 17944374442 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Merger Monday
    • October 18
    • The Economist, "Merger Monday", October 18, 1997, 75-76.
    • (1997) The Economist , pp. 75-76


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.