How we know what we intend

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 161, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 327-346

  Paul, Sarah K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief; Intention; Self knowledge; Transparency

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867130700     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9741-2     Document Type: Article

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