Phenomenology and connectionism

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 2, Issue NOV, 2011, Pages

  Yoshimi, Jeff ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Connectionism; Dynamical systems theory; Husserl; Neural networks; Supervenience

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867079604     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00288     Document Type: Article

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