Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots

Scientific Reports

Volumn 2, Issue , 2012, Pages

  Masuda, Naoki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHM; ANIMAL; ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS;

ALGORITHMS; ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS;

EID: 84867021033     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20452322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/srep00646     Document Type: Article

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