The partnership of stability in Xinjiang: State-society interactions following the July 2009 unrest

China Journal

Volumn , Issue 68, 2012, Pages 79-105

  Cliff, Thomas ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GOVERNANCE APPROACH; GOVERNMENT RELATIONS; POLICY MAKING; SOCIAL CONFLICT; STATE ROLE; STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS;

CHINA; URUMQI; XINJIANG UYGUR;

EID: 84866299553     PISSN: 13249347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/666581     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. J. M. Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 8.
2. Uyghurs were not the only perpetrators of violence on 5 July 2009. James Millward and Radio Free Asia both cite reports of state security forces using lethal force against Uyghurs through the night of 5 July. See James A. Millward, "Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence Mark a Turning Point?" Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 4(2009), pp. 352-54;
3. Radio Free Asia, "A City Gripped by Fear", 6 July 2009, http://www.rfa.org/english/multimedia/VideoXinjiangUnrest-07062009141835.html (accessed 10 June 2011);
4. Radio Free Asia, "A Day of Violence in Urumqi", 6 July 2009, http://www.rfa.org/english/multimedia/SlideshowUrumqiRiot-07062009121840.html (accessed 10 June 2011).
5. The demonstration on 5 July began as a peaceful affair, demanding a thorough and transparent government investigation into the Shaoguan incident on 26 June, in which two Uyghurs had been killed by Han mobs. James A. Millward, "Introduction", pp. 351-52;
6. China News Online, "Xinjiang pilu da-za-qiangshao-sha baoli fanzui shijian dangri fazhan shi-mo" (Xinjiang Announces How the Illegal Beating, Smashing, Looting, Burning and Killing Incident Developed), Chinanews, 6 July 2009, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/07-06/1762907.shtml (accessed 26 March 2012).
7. For video footage of the Shaoguan incident that circulated among Uyghurs in Xinjiang before 7/5, see "Chinese Commies Massacre Uyghur Innocent Workers 3", YouTube, 29 June 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 6uN32RSb92w&feature=related (accessed 30 March 2012).
8. For an example of the video footage of the 5 July riots that circulated in Xinjiang in the second half of 2009, see "Uygur Mobs Killing Chinese clip 2 of 3. July 5, 2009 Urumqi, Xinjiang, China", YouTube, 22 August 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQZVY7wDxTY (accessed 27 March 2012).
9. "Zizhiqu mianqu Li Zhi Wulumuqi shi wei shuji zhiwu: Zhu Hailun jieren" (Autonomous Region Dismisses Li Zhi as Ürümqi Party Secretary: Zhu Hailun Takes Over), Ku'erle wanbao (Korla Evening News), 7 September 2009, pp. 1, 11.
10. Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui, which deals, among other things, with internal social stability. Xinhua, "Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu dangwei zhuyao lingdao tongzhi zhiwu tiaozheng" (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee Adjusts Leaders' Duties), Online, 24 April 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-04/24/c-1253737.htm (accessed 30 November 2011).
11. William Hurst, "Mass Frames and Worker Protest", in Kevin J. O'Brien (ed.), Popular Protest in China (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 71. Emphasis in original.
12. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
13. Elizabeth J. Perry, "Chinese Conceptions of 'Rights': From Mencius to Mao-and Now", Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1(2008), pp. 44-45.
14. For more of these, see Andrew Mertha, China's Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 65-93;
15. Hung and Stephen Chiu, "Voices of Xiagang: Naming, Blaming, and Framing", in Thomas B. Gold, William Hurst, Jaeyoun Won and Li Qiang (eds), Laid-Off Workers in a Workers' State: Unemployment with Chinese Characteristics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 95-114.
16. James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia 1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 58-75;
17. Nicolas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", The China Journal, No. 44(2000), p. 80;
18. Liu Yong, "An Economic Band-aid: Beijing's New Approach to Xinjiang", China Security, Vol. 6, No. 2(2010), pp. 41-54.
19. Calculated from Xinjiang Statistical Bureau (ed.), Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook (Urumqi: Xinjiang University Publishing House, 2010), section 3-18;
20. National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 2010), section 4-2.
21. See also "Guo zi wei xie 120 jia yangqi mouhua chanye huanjiang: Wang Yong, Zhang Chunxian chuxi bing jianghua" (SASAC Organises 120 Central SOEs to Assist Xinjiang through Industry: Wang Yong and Zhang Chunxian Attend and Give Speeches), Xinjiang ribao (Xinjiang Daily), 21 August 2011, http://cpc.people.com.en/GB/64093/117005/15469161.html (accessed 17 January 2012).
22. Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
23. Gaubatz describes frontiers of control as characterized by settlers staying close to fortified urban centers; they are primarily trade and transport corridors, and any agriculture is a subsistence, rather than a profit-making, venture. Frontiers of settlement are characterized by settlers moving out into the surrounding regions, establishing agricultural and extractive industries and, often, "disrupt[ing] local settlement and subsistence". Piper Rae Gaubatz, Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 21.
24. Quoted in Gardner Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent", Policy Studies, Vol. 11(2004), p. 27.
25. Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan, rendered into English as "Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps".
26. In 1954, the bingtuan was 96 per cent populated by Han while Xinjiang as a whole was below 7 per cent Han. Xinjiang Bingtuan Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 2007), section 3-4;
27. Xinjiang Statistical Bureau (ed.), China Data Online, "Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 1955-2005" (Uriimqi: Xinjiang University Publishing House, 2005), Vol. 1, section 2-3.
28. James D. Seymour, "Xinjiang's Production and Construction Corps, and the Sinification of Eastern Turkestan", Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2(2000), pp. 171-93.
29. Shugang Li and Hanlin Wang, "Deng Xiaoping dui Mao Zedong tunken sixiang de zhongda gongxian" (Deng Xiaoping's Great Contribution to Mao Zedong's "Stationing Troops to Guard the Border and Open the Wasteland" Theory), Bingtuan dangxiao xuebao (The Journal of the Bingtuan Party School), Vol. 85, No. 3(2004), p. 7;
30. Thomas Matthew James Cliff, "Neo Oasis: The Xinjiang Bingtuan in the Twenty-first Century", Asian Studies Review, Vol. 33, No. 1(2009), pp. 83-106.
31. The most comprehensive single volume on contemporary Xinjiang, S. Frederick Starr (ed.), Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2004)
32. was accompanied by a policy paper called The Xinjiang Problem (S. Frederick Starr and Graham E. Fuller, The Xinjiang Problem [Baltimore: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, 2004], pp. 16, 74, 75), which stated explicitly "What Uyghurs Should Do" and "What Beijing Should Do"-incorrectly posing "the Uyghurs and the Chinese State" as the only "key players in Xinjiang".
33. The term "securitization" was coined by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
34. James D. Seymour, "Xinjiang's Production and Construction Corps", p. 185.
35. Sun Liping, a professor of sociology at Qinghua University and recognized expert on in/stability in China, stated in December 2010: "The establishment of a market economy tends to diffuse social unrest-whereas in the past, social unrest would lead to direct action against the government, things are different now: tensions between labor and capital are directed at capital, against employers and development zone bosses and perhaps, at most, the local government. Unrest is never targeted at higher levels of government, such as provincial governments". Sun Liping, "Sun Liping Discusses Social Stability in China" (2010), http://shanghaiist.com/2007/ll/09/sun-liping. php (accessed 4 December 2010).
36. "Xinjiang gongwuyuan zhang gongzi xiaoxi" (Xinjiang Public Servants' Salary Raise Information), Baidu Tieba Chatroom, 2008, http://tieba.baidu.com/f?z=312919295&ct=3355443208dm=0&sc=0&rn= 30&tn=baiduPostBrowser&word=percentB8percentB7percentBFpercentB5&pn- 30 (accessed 4 May 2011).
37. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, White Paper: Devebpment and Progress in Xinjiang (21 September 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/21/content-12090477-8.htm (accessed 4 May 2011).
38. Data compiled from Ministry of Labor (ed.), China Labor Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1990), p. 87;
39. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Statistical Bureau (ed.), Xinjiang 50 Years 1955-2005 (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2005), pp. 394-95;
40. Ministry of Labor (ed.), China Labour Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2009), section 4-3. One reason offered for this fall in wage rank was the phasing-out of subsidies for remote and hardship postings, known as dicha butie, which some of my informants say were a significant proportion of their total income in the early 1990s.
41. The peaceful resolution of a large-scale protest in Wukan, Guangdong, was hailed as a "new model", testifying to the assumed use offeree by the authorities. Yu Jianrong terms this reflexive resort to force "rigid stability". See Jianrong Yu, "Rigid Stability: An Explanatory Framework for China's Social Situation", China Elections and Governance (27 May 2009), http://chinaelectionsblog.net/?p=12932 (accessed 19 January 2012);
42. Willy Lam, "The Grim Future of the Wukan Model for Managing Dissent", China Brief, Vol. 12, No. 1(2012), pp. 3-5.
43. On earlier cases, see Andrew Mertha, China's Water Warriors, pp. 65-93;
44. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance, p. 12.
45. For an extensive discussion of protest in Xinjiang, see Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 105-34 and Appendix.
46. Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 87.
47. Cai cites Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Jaswinder Khattra, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory", Sociological Forum, Vol. 14, No. 1(1999), pp. 27-54.
48. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance;
49. Elizabeth J. Perry, "Chinese Conceptions of 'Rights'";
50. Andrew Mertha, China's Water Warriors;
51. Eva Hung and Stephen Chiu, "Voices of Xiagang".
52. See Qinggang Li, "The Force Behind Leadership", China Daily, online, 1 July 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/cpc2011/2011-07/01/ content-12814074.htm (accessed 28 November 2011);
53. "Fazhan shi diyi yaowu, wending shi diyi zeren" (Development Is the Number One Task, Stability Is the Number One Responsibility) (8 July 2005), CPPCC News Online, http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34952/3528323.html (accessed 15 November 2011).
54. "Wang Lequan jiangshu Xinjiang 90 niandai fenlie douzheng: ceng bei lie ansha mingdan" (Wang Lequan Tells of the Fight against Separatism in the 1990s: A List of Violent Incidents in the Past), ChinaNews.com, 2 February 2008, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2008/02-20/1167713.shtml (accessed 20 November 2011).
55. As Mertha notes: "the 'fragmented authoritarianism' (FA) framework, first proposed in 1988, has remained the most durable heuristic through which to study Chinese politics". Andrew Mertha, "'Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0": Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process", The China Quarterly, No. 200(2009), p. 996.
56. For the original concept, see Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
57. See, for example, CPPCC News Online, "Fazhan shi diyi yaowu".
58. Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China, p. 88.
59. Damian Grammaticas, "Trekking 1000 Km in China for E-Mail", BBC News, 11 February 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8506601.stm (accessed 1 December 2011).
60. "Xinjiang jinri qi quanmian huifu hulianwang yewu" (Xinjiang's Internet Service Fully Restored), news.china.com.cn, 14 May 2010, http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2010-05/14/content-20038848.htm (accessed 12 May 2011);
61. "Yongxin shouhu jiankang kaifang de wangluo huanjing" (Diligently Protect a Healthy and Open Internet Environment), Tianshannet, 14 May 2010, http://xjts.cn/news/content/2010-05/14/content-4972409.htm (accessed 14 January 2012).
62. "Zui han sanbu yaoyan bei ju 10 tian" (Drunk Man Gets 10 Days Jail for Spreading Rumors), Ku'erle wanbao, 13 July 2009, p. 6.
63. The logic here is that, since the Communist Party is the party of the masses, it speaks for the masses. In this case then, "the masses" are conceptually distinct from the "public" whose opinion the media is supposed to be guiding. Xing Li, "Zhongxuanbu lingdao zai wo qu weiwen diaoyan" (Central Propaganda Ministry Leader in Xinjiang to Convey Sympathy and Conduct Investigation), Xinjiang ribao, 1 August 2009, p. 1.
64. The phenomenon of anti-instability measures producing greater instability is noted in a Qinghua report on stability maintenance. See Social Development Research Group, "New Thinking on Stability Maintenance: Long-Term Social Stability Via Institutionalised Expression of Interests" (13 May 2010), originally published in Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend) on 14 April 2010, http://chinaelectionsblog.net/?p=5220 (accessed 16 May 2011).
65. "The government is useless" became one of the lines being chanted by Han protesters in early September. See Tania Branigan, "New Mass Protests and Violence Break out in Urumqi, Witnesses Claim", The Guardian, 3 September 2009, http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/2009/sep/03/urumqi-china- new-violence-new-claims (accessed 29 November 2011).
66. Examples of these images can be seen at "Ethnic Clashes in Urumqi, China", Boston. com, 8 July 2009, http://www.boston. com/bigpicture/2009/ 07/ethnic-clashes-in-urumqi-china.html accessed (30 March 2012). These extremely graphic images were taken by police photographers and published on the front page of Tianshannet, a government news portal. They were later released by the Xinjiang regional authorities at a media conference on 7 July, but they had been removed from the front page of Tianshannet by mid-morning on 8 July.
67. "Wulumuqi fasheng da-za-qiang-shao yanzhong baoli fanzui shijian" (Violent Criminal Incident in Urumqi: Beating, Smashing, Looting and Burning), Sina.com (Chinese), 6 July 2009, (CCTV News Half Hour), http://news.sina.com.en/c/p/2009-07-06/042318160186.shtml (accessed 11 April 2011).
68. "Civilians and Armed Police Officer Killed in Northwest China Violence", Xinhua, 6 July 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/ 06/content-11658819.htm (accessed 20 November 2011).
69. For an example of some of the surveillance camera footage of the 5 July riots that circulated in Xinjiang in the second half of 2009, see "Uygur Mobs Killing Chinese" (see above, note 3).
70. For an example of the footage that I heard described but did not see while in Xinjiang, see "Raw Footage-Uygur Terrorists Killing Innocent People in Xinjiang", YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 7g44LGLXjYs&feature=related&has-verified=1 (accessed 27 March 2012). I am indebted to David O'Brien for these links.
71. Kuanhong Wu and Yuexin Jiang, "Ru ci ganhuo" (Carrying Out Duties in This Manner), Ku'erle wanbao (Korla Evening News), 29 July 2009.
72. People's Daily Online, "Guanyu shixing dang-zheng lingdao ganbu wen ze de zanxing guiding" (Regarding the Implementation of Provisional Measures to Hold High-Level Party and Government Cadres Accountable), People's Daily, 13 July 2009, available at http://renshi.people.com.cn/GB/9639591.html (accessed 7 December 2010).
73. Willy Lam, "The Xinjiang Crisis: A Test for Beijing's Carrot-and-Stick Strategy", China Brief, Vol. 9, No. 15(2009), pp. 2-4.
74. ChinaView, "Crowds Demand Security Guarantees in Urumqi after Hypodermic Syringe Attacks" (4 September 2009), Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2009-09/04/content-12000507.htm (accessed 27 November 2011).
75. Tania Branigan, New Mass Protests.
76. Projected losses for the year came to 5 billion yuan. See Xinhua, "Hefty Subsidy Sought to Salvage Xinjiang Tourism", China Daily, 16 July 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009xinjiangriot/2009-07/16/ content-8436842.htm (accessed 1 December 2011);
77. Xinhua, "Travel Agencies Suspend Group Trips to Xinjiang", Global Times, 11 July 2009, http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/truexinjiang/ tourism/guide/2011-04/445484.html (accessed 1 December 2011).
78. The information on Korla comes from my own observations and interviews; for Ürümqi, see "Wulumuqi qian 7 ge yue shangpinfang chengjiaojia tongbi zengzhang jin er cheng" (Commercial Housing in Ürümqi Rises 20 per cent in Previous Seven Months), Ku'erle wanbao, 10 August 2009, p. 2;
79. 2 in Previous 8 Months), Ku'erle wanbao, 15 September 2009, p. 2;
80. "9 yue Wulumuqi yidi gou fang jiaoyi liang hui wen" (Housing Sales to Non-Ürümqi Residents Stabilize in September), Ku'erle wanbao, 19 October 2009, p. 2.
81. Since Zhang Chunxian took office, the PRC (media and government) discourse about Xinjiang is that it has entered a "new era" (xin shiqi). See Chuanguo Zhang, "The Population Problems in Xinjiang and Its Controls in the New Stage", Chinese Academy of Sciences, 1 October 2009, http://www.csscipaper.com/socialsciences/demography/22674.html (accessed 27 November 2011);
82. XUAR Department of Culture, "Qiantan xin shiqi xuyao Xinjiang jingshen" (A Brief Discussion of the New Era's Need for Xinjiang Spirit), (25 October 2011, http://www.qzgw.org/templet/dangwei/ShowArticle.jsp?id=122703 (accessed 27 November 2011).
83. He Zhanjun, "Zhang Chunxian zhili Xinjiang yi nian: pingjun budao 3 tian jiu you yi xiang huimin zhengce chutai" (Zhang Chunxian's First Year of Governing Xinjiang: for Each Less-than-three-day Period Since He Took Office, an Average of One Policy to Benefit the People [of Xinjiang] Has Been Announced), Xinhua, 24 April 2011, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/ 14467759.html (accessed 11 May 2011).
84. "Chinese Central Government to Step up Support for Xinjiang: Senior Leaders", Xinhua, 31 March 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/ china/2010-03/31/c-13231387-2.htm (accessed 11 May 2011).
85. China Government Administration of Economic Growth, "Zhili Xinjiang: kaipi xin silu" (Governing Xinjiang: A New Approach), Lingdao zhengce xinxi (Leadership and Policy Information), Vol. 21(31 May 2010), pp. 24-25;
86. Hu Yue, "Hand in Hand: China Unveils a Partner Assistance Program to Propel Xinjiang Toward Economic Prosperity and Social Stability", Beijing Review, Vol. 23(10 June 2010), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/business/txf2010-06/ 07/content-277403.htm (accessed 15 May 2011).
87. Liu Yong, "An Economic Band-aid", p. 46.
88. He Zhanjun, "Zhang Chunxian zhili Xinjiang yi nian".
89. People's Daily Online, "Xinjiang Party Chief Opens Microblog to Better Hear Public Opinions", People's Daily Online, 4 March 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7307711.html (accessed 11 May 2011).
90. Xinhua, "Xinjiang Party Chief Urges Timely Handling of People's Appeals", CRIEnglish.com, 18 March 2011, http://english.cri.cn/6909/2011/ 03/18/1461s626951.htm (accessed 12 May 2011).
91. As well as works already cited above, see Liangbing Xie, "The Party's Top Ranking Blogger", Jingji guancha bao (The Economic Observer), 10 January 2012, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2012/0110/219390.shtml (accessed 17 January 2012);
92. "Xinjiang Government Addresses Problems Facing Businesswomen", Women of China, 12 January 2012, http://www.womenofchina.com.cn/html/report/ 3784-l.htm (accessed 17 January 2012).
93. He Zhanjun, "Zhang Chunxian zhili Xinjiang yi nian".
94. "Zhongyang jueding zai Xinjiang Kashi she jingji tequ" (The Central Government Decides to Build a Special Economic Zone in Kashgar, Xinjiang), news.163.com, 21 May 2010, http://news.163.com/10/0521/08/ 676ORIAO0001124J.html (accessed 14 May 2011);
95. Lu Na, "S. Xinjiang's First National Economic Zone Established" (19 April 2011), http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-04/19/content-22396350.htm (accessed 15 May 2011).
96. "Xinjiang Builds Rural Roads for 1.2 Million Farmers" People's Daily Online, 30 March 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/98649/ 7335453.html (accessed 15 May 2011);
97. "Xinjiang to Build Six More Airports by 2015", eChinacities.com, 21 January 2011, http://www.echinacities.com/urumqi/city-in- pulse/xinjiang-to-build-six-more-airports-by-2015.html (accessed 14 May 2011);
98. Li Mu, "China to Set up First Desert Airport in Xinjiang" (12 February 2011), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7285830.html (accessed 15 May 2011);
99. "Xinjiang Begins Construction of 18 Water Conservation Projects", People's Daily Online, 3 April 2011, http://english.peopledaily. com.cn/90001/90776/7339222.html (accessed 15 May 2011);
100. "New Railway to Cut Short Trip between Capital Cities of Tibet, Xinjiang", Xinhua, 6 March 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/ china/2011-03/06/c-13764216.htm (accessed 19 July 2011).
101. The American security and surveillance equipment supplier Honeywell is one of the foreign companies to take advantage of this new "openness", and the perception of social unrest in Xinjiang. See "Honeywell Opens New Office in Xinjiang, China", Asia Today, 26 April 2011, http://asiatoday. com/pressrelease/honeywell-opens-new-office-xinjiang-china (accessed 15 May 2011).
102. For preferential policies, see Xinhua, "Foreign Trade More Than Triples in China's Xinjiang", Global Times, 14 February 2011, http://business.globaltimes.cn/china-economy/2011-02/622556.html (accessed 15 May 2011);
103. China Government Administration of Economic Growth, "Zhili Xinjiang"; Xinhua, "China's Xinjiang Eases Rules for Foreign Investment to Boost Inbound Investment", People's Daily Online, 22 March 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/7326839.html (accessed 15 May 2011).
104. "Centrally Administered SOEs Urged to Promote Economic Development in Xinjiang", Xinhua, 20 August 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english2010/china/2011-08/20/c-131063327.htm (accessed 19 November 2011).
105. Yong Wang, "Wang Yong zai quanguo dangjian yanjiuhui guoyou qiye dangjian yanjiu zhuanye weiyuanhui chengli dahui ji diyi nianhui shang de zhici" (Wang Yong, Inauguration Speech at the First Annual Meeting of the Party Building in State-Owned Enterprises Professional Committee, Under the National Party Building Research Association), Guo Zi Wei Xinxi Zhongxin (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Information Centre), 2010, http://www.sasac.gov. cn/nl 180/nl566/n259715/n263898/7529629. html (accessed 5 February 2011).
106. For example, see "Xinjiang cheng shen tianranqi ru hu mingnian zhongdian shi nanjiang huanwang jianshe" (South Xinjiang to be Focal Point of Construction of Natural Gas Residential Supply Network Next Year), Tianshannet, 28 December 2011, http://www.tianshannet.com/news/content/2011-12/ 28/content-6457879.htm (accessed 27 March 2012);
107. "Dushanzi qu Ruijing, Meihao xiaoqu tianranqi ru hu gongzuo tongzhi" (Work Notice on Supply of Natural Gas to Homes in Ruijing and Meihao Districts of Duzhanzi Area), Dushanzi Online, 1 March 2012, http://www.dsz.cc/news/bulletin/2012/31/1231172631A38F JH5FA19GAAG4980H.asp (accessed 27 March 2012).
108. See, for example, "Xinjiang People, I'm Sorry, Thank You", Tewpiq, 3 July 2008, http://www.thenewdominion. net/209/xinjiang-people-im- sorry-thank-you/omment-2481 (accessed 14 May 2011).
109. "Resource Tax Reform Helps Local Government", Xinhua, 4 June 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/video/2010-06/04/c-13333541.htm (accessed 19 July 2011).
110. For example, in 2009 crude oil was taxed at 28 yuan per metric ton, but is now taxed at 5 per cent of the value. Even at the low end of the price spectrum (4800 yuan per metric ton), this means a tenfold revenue increase from crude oil alone. The new tax regime came into force on 1 June 2010 for oil and natural gas, and Xinjiang was on track to net 5 billion yuan from taxing resources in 2011. "China Overhauls Natural Resource Tax: the Pockets of Local Governments Are Bound to Swell Quickly Due to the Natural Resource Tax Overhaul", Caixin, 21 June 2010, http://english.caixin. cn/2010-05-21/100146123.html (accessed 18 November 2011);
111. Xinhua, "China's Xinjiang to Earn Five Bin Yuan in Resource Tax in 2011", Global Times, 10 November 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/ tabid/99/ID/683296/Chinas-Xinjiang-to-earn-5-bln-yuan-inresource-tax-in-2011. aspx (accessed 18 November 2011).
112. Shao Wei and Mao Weihua, "Training Program to Boost Employment in Xinjiang" (26 March 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-03/ 26/content-12231521.htm (accessed 15 May 2011).
113. "NW China Official Sentenced to Life for Taking Bribes", China Daily, 30 March 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-03/30/content- 12251513.htm (accessed 15 May 2011).
114. "Xinjiang shishi gongwuyuan gongzi gaige: 8 yue zhang gongzi" (Xinjiang Implements Public Servants' Salary Reform: Raise Due in August), fabang.com, 29 July 2010, http://www.fabang.com/a/2010 0729/172413.html (accessed 18 November 2011);
115. Xue Zhang, "Xinjiang shixing jiceng ganbu gangwei butie deng 4 xiang zhengce" (Xinjiang Implements Four Policies to Support Grass-roots Cadres) (3 September 2011), http://www.shache.gov. cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsId=4149 (accessed 18 November 2011).
116. Informants who visited and lived in south-west Xinjiang confirmed that the practice of coercive Uyghur labor migration to eastern China continued into 2011. For an analysis of the policy, see Steve Hess, "Dividing and Conquering the Shop Floor: Uyghur Labour Export and Labour Segmentation in China's Industrial East", Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 4(2009), pp. 403-16.
117. For an in-depth and damning report on the lack of religious freedom in Xinjiang, see Human Rights Watch, "Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang", Vol. 17, No. 2(C) (2005), http://www.hrichina.org/ sites/default/files/oldsite/pdfs/Xinjiang-Report.pdf (accessed 1 December 2011). A more recent report by the Congressional Executive Committee on China suggests that the situation has worsened.
118. See Voice of America, "Religious Freedom Worsens In China" (21 September 2011), http://www.voanews.com/policy/editorials/Religious-Freedom- Worsens-In-China-130288573.html (accessed 1 December 2011).
119. Zang Xiaowei found in a 2005 survey that, on average, even relatively well-educated urban Uyghurs in Urumqi received an income 21.8 per cent less than their Han counterparts, and in the non-state sector (where there are no positive discrimination policies) this figure was 52 per cent. In the same survey, Zang also found that there was no statistically significant difference between Han and Uyghur employment prospects in the "redistributive" sector (government and public organizations), but that there was an ethnic difference in both state and private enterprises. Xiaowei Zang, "Affirmative Action, Economic Reforms, and Han-Uyghur Variation in Job Attainment in the State Sector in Urumchi", The China Quarterly, Vol. 202, No. 1(2010), pp. 344-61;
120. Xiaowei Zang, "Uyghur-Han Earnings Differentials in Urumchi", The China Journal, No. 65(2011), pp. 152, 155.
121. At time of writing in early 2012, inflation without salary growth is a China-wide phenomenon, but is even worse in Xinjiang, where official inflation was running at 6.9 per cent per annum, significantly above the official national level of 5.4 per cent. Food was the hardest hit, running at 14.8 per cent nationwide and, according to my informants, well over that in Xinjiang. This is recognized as a potential future cause of social instability: in late August 2011, the Xinjiang government offered low-income residents a temporary subsidy to help offset the massive inflation. See China Radio International, "Xinjiang Residents Subsidized in an Effort to Offset Inflation", Xinhua, 29 August 2011, http://english.cri.cn/6909/2011/08/29/195s655726.htm (accessed 18 November 2011).
122. Data from Korla are from my own research; for Ürümqi, see "China Housing Boom Spreads to Smaller Cities", Bloomberg News, 23 June 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-22/china-housing-boom-s-spread- to-smaller-cities-poses-dilemma-for-government.html (accessed 1 December 2011).
123. Until 2011, Xinjiang high school graduates were not allowed to apply to universities in Hong Kong and Macao. "Hong Kong, Macao Universities to Admit Xinjiang Students", Xinhua, 22 May 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english2010/culture/2011-05/22/c-13887871.htm (accessed 19 July 2011).
124. Liu Yong, "An Economic Band-aid".
125. Xue Zhang, "Xinjiang shixing jiceng ganbu gangwei butie deng 4 xiang zhengce".
126. Bruce Gilley, "Paradigms of Chinese Politics: Kicking Society Back Out" Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 20, No. 70(2011), p. 529.