Collusion-preserving computation

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 7417 LNCS, Issue , 2012, Pages 124-143

  Alwen, Joël ^a   Katz, Jonathan ^b   Maurer, Ueli ^a   Zikas, Vassilis ^b  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARBITRARY COMMUNICATION; COMMUNICATION MODELS; GAME-THEORETIC; NETWORK TOPOLOGY; PHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS; SUPPORT COMPOSITION;

CRYPTOGRAPHY; ELECTRIC NETWORK TOPOLOGY; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION THEORY;

COMMUNICATION;

EID: 84865489601     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_9     Document Type: Conference Paper

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