Interventionist counterfactuals

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 160, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 139-166

  Briggs, Rachael ^a,b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Causal modeling; Counterfactuals; Modus ponens; Simplification of disjunctive antecedents

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865411465     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-9908-5     Document Type: Article

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