Disjunctive causes

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 103, Issue 10, 2006, Pages 521-538

  Sartorio, Carolina ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60949368656     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil20061031029     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. For an argument of this type against disjunctive events, see David Lewis, "Events, " in Philosophical Papers, Volume II (New York: Oxford, 1986), pp. 241-69.
2. See, for example, Jonathan Bennett, Events and Their Names (Indianapolis:Hackett, 1988);
3. John Mackie, "Causes and Conditions, " in Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley, eds., Causation (New York: Oxford, 1993), pp. 33-55;
4. D.H. Mellor, The Facts of Causation (New York: Routledge, 1995).
5. David Lewis discusses this view on omissions in Postscript D to"Causation, " in Philosophical Papers, Volume II (New York: Oxford, 1986), pp. 189-93. Other cases where one might be led to think that disjunctionsare causes are "preemptive prevention" cases (these cases alsoinvolve absences, although as intermediaries in the chain; see note 16 below).
6. For an argument that overdetermination is widespread, see Jonathan Schaffer, "Overdetermining Causes, " Philosophical Studies, CXIV(2003): 23-45.
7. For an argument that omissions cannot enter in causal relations, see Helen Beebee, "Causing and Nothingness, " in John Collins, Ned Hall, and Laurie Paul, eds. Causation and Counterfactuals (Cambridge: MIT, 2004), pp.291-308.
8. Alan Penczek appears to be an exception - see his "Disjunctive Properties and Causal Efficacy, " Philosophical Studies, LXXVI (1997):203-19. Penczek seems to believe that any ordinary case where an outcome couldbe caused in one of two ways might be a case where the outcome has a disjunctivecause. But I find his argument unconvincing. Penczek would argue, for instance, that if I shoot a bullet that kills a person but there was a backup assassinwaiting in reserve, then my shooting is not a cause because the relevantcounterfactual dependencies fail to obtain (in particular, the death would stillhave occurred if I had not shot). Thus, since we do not want to say that theoutcome is uncaused, we should say that a disjunctive condition (presumably, thefact that at least one of us shot) is the cause. However, if anything, cases ofthis type are a reason to believe that counterfactual accounts of causation arewrong, not a reason to believe in disjunctive causes.
9. See William Rowe, "Causing and Being Responsible for What Is Inevitable, " American Philosophical Quarterly, XXVI, 2 (1989): 153-59;
10. Laurie Paul, "Aspect Causation, " this JOURNAL, XCVII, 4 (April2000): 235-56;
11. Stephen Yablo, "De Facto Dependence, " this JOURNAL, XCIX, 3(March 2002): 130-48;
12. Carolina Sartorio, "Causes as Difference-Makers, " Philosophical Studies, CXXIII, 1-2 (2005): 71-96.
13. Hall, "Causation and the Price of Transitivity, " this JOURNAL, XCVII, 4 (April 2000): 198-221 (Hall calls cases of this type "interactiveswitches, " given the existence of a physical connection between theswitching event and the outcome). Hall seems to now have changed his view onthese matters (personal communication).
14. Someone might think that the Flipper and Reconnecter case resembles a"preemptive prevention" case more than an overdetermination case (fordiscussion of preemptive prevention cases, see Michael McDermott, "Redundant Causation, " British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, XLVI (1995): 523-44;
15. and John Collins, "Preemptive Prevention, " this JOURNAL, XCVII, 4 (April 2000): 223-34). Suppose that a catcher catches a ball that was flyingtowards a window; however, a second catcher was standing between the firstcatcher and the window and would have caught the ball otherwise. What caused thewindow to remain intact? Clearly, the second catcher did not do anything. But, given the presence of the second catcher, the window was in no danger ofbreaking, so maybe the first catcher was not a cause either (this intuition isreinforced if we substitute a solid wall for the second catcher). So maybe thecause was a disjunctive fact involving the two catchers? (The thought beingthat, if neither catcher had been present, the window would have shattered.)There are certainly similarities between preemptive prevention cases and the Flipper and Reconnecter case. But there are also important differences. One maindifference is that preemptive prevention cases involve absences along thecausal chain - for example, the ball's not hitting the wall - whereas the Flipper and Reconnecter case does not. This makes the Flipper and Reconnectercase an "ordinary" case (as defined in my introduction).
16. Typically we think that an agent causally contributes to an outcome justin case one of the agent's individual actions or omissions causally contributesto the outcome. In "How to Be Responsible for Something without Causing It" (Philosophical Perspectives, XVIII (2004): 315-36), I lay out thereceived view about the relationship between moral responsibility and causation, and I argue against it on the basis of an independent example. I then arguethat moral claims are still dependent on causal claims, but not in the wayspecified by the received view.
17. See, for example, Jerry Fodor, "Special Sciences, " Synthese, XXVIII (1974): 97-115.