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Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 258-277

Fishery management by harvester cooperatives

Author keywords

Collective action; Fishery cooperative; Rights based management

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; COOPERATIVE SECTOR; DEVELOPING WORLD; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; FISHERY MANAGEMENT; FISHING EFFORT; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 84865371640     PISSN: 17506816     EISSN: 17506824     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/reep/res008     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (75)

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