Fishery Cooperatives as an Alternative to ITQs: Implications of the American Fisheries Act

Marine Resource Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-16

  Matulich, Scott C ^a   Sever, Murat ^b   Inaba, Fred ^a  

^a WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CITIGROUP   (United States)

Author keywords

American Fisheries Act; Market realignment strategy; Non cooperative bargaining; Pollock rationalization

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141705037     PISSN: 07381360     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/mre.16.1.42629310     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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