Property rights in fisheries: How much can individual transferable quotas accomplish?

Review of Environmental Economics and Policy

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 217-236

  Arnason, Ragnar ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ICELAND   (Iceland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FISHERY ECONOMICS; FISHERY MANAGEMENT; FISHING; PROPERTY RIGHTS; QUOTA SYSTEM;

EID: 84865365440     PISSN: 17506816     EISSN: 17506824     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/reep/res011     Document Type: Article

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