Conflicting uses of marine resources: Can ITQs promote an efficient solution?

Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 145-174

  Arnason, Ragnar ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ICELAND   (Iceland)

Author keywords

Commercial and recreational fishing conflicts; Conflicting use of marine resources; Conservation quotas; Fishing and conservation conflicts; ITQs

Indexed keywords

COMMERCIAL SPECIES; CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; FISHERY MANAGEMENT; MARINE RESOURCE; QUOTA SYSTEM; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RESOURCE USE; SPECIES CONSERVATION;

EID: 58149133681     PISSN: 1364985X     EISSN: 14678489     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8489.2007.00424.x     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Arnason, R. (1990). Minimum information management in fisheries, Canadian Journal of Economics 23, 630-653.
2. Arnason, R. (2000). Property Rights as a Means of Economic Organization. In R. Shotton (ed.) Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management. FAO FisheriesTechnical Paper 401/1. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome.
3. Arnason, R. (2006). Property rights in fisheries: Iceland's experience with ITQs. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries (in press).
4. Buchanan, J. (1965). An economic theory of clubs, Economica 32, 1-14.
5. Clark, C.W., and G.R. Munro. (1975). The Economics of Fishing and Modern Capital Theory: A Simplified Approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2, 92-106.
6. Clark, C.W. (1976). Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources. John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.
7. Coase, R.H. (1960). The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44.
8. Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value. Cowles Foundation. Monograph 17. Yale University Press, New Haven. CT.
9. Furubotn, E. and Richter, R. (2005). Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics, 2nd edn. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
10. Gordon, H.S. (1954). Economic theory of a common property resource: The fishery, Journal of Political Economy 62, 124-142.
11. Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams, Econometrica 41, 617-631.
12. Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162, 1243-47.
13. Pontryagin, L.S., Boltyanski, V.S., Gramkeldize, R.V. and Mishchenko, E.F. (1962). The Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes. Wiley, New York, NY.
14. Samuelson, P.A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure, Review of Economics and Statistics 36, 387-389.
15. Samuelson, P.A. (1955). A diagrammatic exposition of the theory of public expenditure, Review of Economics and Statistics 37, 350-356.
16. Schmalensee, R.P.L., Joskow, A.D., Ellerman, J.P., Montero and Bailey, E.M. (1998). An interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading, Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 53-68.
17. Shotton, R. (2000). (Editor) Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 401/1 & 401/2. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.
18. Smith, V.L. (1969). On models of commercial fishing, Journal of Political Economy 77, 181-198.
19. 2 allowance trading, Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 69-88.
20. Turvey, R. (1964). Optimization and suboptimization in fishery regulations, American Economic Review 54, 64-76.
21. Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16, 8-37.
22. Wilen, J.E. & F.R. Homans (1994). Marketing losses in regulated open access fisheries. In A.J. Catanzano and J. Sutinen (editors). Proceedings of the 6th Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade. IFREMER, Paris, France.
23. Williamson, O.E. (1970). Corporate Control and Business Behavior: An Inquiry Into the Effects of Organization Form on Enterprise Behavior. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.