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Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 355-372

Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery's Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms

Author keywords

Africa; Bribery; Corruption; Latin America; Peru; Uganda

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; INCOME DISTRIBUTION;

EID: 84864791836     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.06.001     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (75)

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