Selectivity on aid modality: Determinants of budget support from multilateral donors

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 267-284

  Clist, Paul ^c   Isopi, Alessia ^b   Morrissey, Oliver ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Aid Modality; Aid Selectivity; Budget Support; Project Aid

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864400446     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-011-9137-2     Document Type: Article

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