The effects of the international security environment on national military expenditures: A multicountry study

International Organization

Volumn 66, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 491-513

  Nordhaus, William ^a   Oneal, John R ^b   Russett, Bruce ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84863976706     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818312000173     Document Type: Article

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