Estimating adverse selection and moral hazard effects with hospital invoices data in a government-controlled healthcare system

Health Economics (United Kingdom)

Volumn 21, Issue 8, 2012, Pages 883-901

  Liu, Xiangping ^a   Nestic, Danijel ^b   Vukina, Tomislav ^a  

^a NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS   (Croatia)

Author keywords

adverse and advantageous selection; matching estimators; moral hazard

Indexed keywords

ADULT; AGRICULTURAL WORKER; ARTICLE; CROATIA; EMPLOYMENT; FEMALE; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HEALTH INSURANCE; HOSPITAL SERVICE; HUMAN; MAJOR CLINICAL STUDY; MALE; MEDICAL CARE; OUTPATIENT CARE; PHYSIOTHERAPY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REHABILITATION CARE; SELF EMPLOYMENT; ULTRASOUND;

ADULT; AGE FACTORS; AGED; CROATIA; FEMALE; HEALTH SERVICES; HEALTH SERVICES NEEDS AND DEMAND; HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION; HUMANS; INSURANCE SELECTION BIAS; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; MORALS; NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMS; RISK ADJUSTMENT; SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS; STATE MEDICINE;

EID: 84863494684     PISSN: 10579230     EISSN: 10991050     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/hec.1756     Document Type: Article

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