Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Some preliminary evidence from the Croatian State-Administered Supplemental Plan

Privredna Kretanja i Ekonomska Politika

Volumn 18, Issue 115, 2008, Pages 24-47

  Vukina, Tomislav ^a   Nestić, Danijel ^b  

^a NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS   (Croatia)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Health insurance; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 49649089166     PISSN: 1330187X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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