Moral hazard and the demand for health services: A matching estimator approach

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1006-1025

  Barros, Pedro Pita ^a   Machado, Matilde P ^b   Sanz de Galdeano, Anna ^c  

^a UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA   (Portugal)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GIRONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Demand for health services; Matching estimator; Moral hazard; Portuguese health system

Indexed keywords

BLOOD; ESTIMATION METHOD; HEALTH INSURANCE; HEALTH SERVICES; HEALTH STATUS; URINE;

ARTICLE; BLOOD ANALYSIS; CORRELATION ANALYSIS; DENTIST; HAZARD; HEALTH CARE NEED; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HEALTH INSURANCE; HEALTH SERVICE; HEALTH STATUS; HUMAN; MORALITY; PORTUGAL; PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE; PROBABILITY; STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE; URINALYSIS;

ADULT; AGED; AGED, 80 AND OVER; FEMALE; HEALTH SERVICES NEEDS AND DEMAND; HUMANS; INSURANCE COVERAGE; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; MORALS; NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMS; PORTUGAL; PRIVATE SECTOR;

EURASIA; EUROPE; PORTUGAL; SOUTHERN EUROPE;

EID: 44649086952     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.02.007     Document Type: Article

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