Evolutionary optimization of parameter sets for adaptive software-agent traders in continuous double auction markets

HP Laboratories Technical Report

Volumn , Issue 99, 2001, Pages

  Cliff, Dave ^a,b,c  

^a HEWLETT PACKARD LABORATORIES   (United Kingdom)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c Digital Media Systems Dept   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agents; Auctions; Genetic algorithms; Traders; Zip

Indexed keywords

CONTINUOUS DOUBLE-AUCTION (CDA); EVOLUTIONARY OPTIMIZATION; ZERO-INTELLIGNCE-PLUS (ZIP);

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER NETWORKS; COMPUTER SOFTWARE; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; FUNCTIONS; GENETIC ALGORITHMS; OPTIMIZATION;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 84862443360     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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