Ubiquitous log odds: A common representation of probability and frequency distortion in perception, action, and cognition

Frontiers in Neuroscience

Volumn , Issue JAN, 2012, Pages

  Zhang, Hang ^a   Maloney, Laurence T ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Decision making; Frequency estimation; Log odds; Probability distortion; Subjective probability; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; PERCEPTION; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOMOTOR PERFORMANCE; TASK PERFORMANCE;

EID: 84861862142     PISSN: 16624548     EISSN: 1662453X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00001     Document Type: Article

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