Policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 102-116

  Millock, Katrin ^a   Xabadia, Angels ^b   Zilberman, David ^c  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GIRONA   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Diffusion; Environmental taxation; Externalities; Monitoring technology adoption; Nanotechnologies; Stock pollution

Indexed keywords

DECENTRALIZED POLICIES; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING; ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION; EXTERNALITIES; HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; MODERN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES; MONITORING EQUIPMENT; MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES; NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES; PRICING SCHEME; TAX RATES;

DIFFUSION; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; NANOTECHNOLOGY; REMOTE SENSING; TAXATION; TRANSPORTATION CHARGES;

POLLUTION;

AUTOMOBILE; DECENTRALIZATION; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY; NANOTECHNOLOGY; NUMERICAL MODEL; ROAD PRICING; STOCK ASSESSMENT; TAX SYSTEM; TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION;

EID: 84861812501     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.02.004     Document Type: Article

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