Phenomenal presence and perceptual awareness: A subjectivist account of perceptual openness to the world

Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 352-383

  Nida Rümelin, Martine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861751439     PISSN: 15336077     EISSN: 17582237     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00208.x     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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