Transparency of experience and the perceptual model of phenomenal awareness

Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 429-455

  Nida Rümelin, Martine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949316869     PISSN: 15208583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00139.x     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Block, N. 2003. Mental paint. In Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, M. Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.). MIT Press.
2. Harman, G. 1990. The intrinsic quality of experience. In Philosophical Perspectives 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, James Tomberlin (ed.). Atascadero: Ridgeview. pp. 31-52.
3. Jackson, F. 2005. Consciousness. In The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, F. Jackson & M. Smith (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 310-333.
4. Levine, J. 2006. Color and color experience: Colors and ways of appearing. Dialectica 60(3): 269-282.
5. Moore, G.E. 1922. Philosophical Studies. London: Routledge.
6. Nida-Rümelin, M. 2006. A puzzle about colors. Dialectica 60(3): 321-336.
7. Tye, M. 1997/2003, "Qualia", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
8. Siewert, C. 1998. The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9. Siewert, C. 2004. Is experience transparent? Philosophical Studies 117:15-41.