Doings and subject causation

Erkenntnis

Volumn 67, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 255-272

  Nida Rümelin, Martine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34948842455     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-007-9064-z     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (18)

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2. Bayne, T. (2007). The feeling of doing: Deconstructing the phenomenology of agency. In W. Prinz & N. Sebanz (Eds.), Disorders of volition. MIT Press.
3. Chisholm, R. M. (1976). Person and object. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
4. Campbell, C. (1976). In defence of free will. London: Allen & Unwin.
5. Frankfurt, H. (1978). The problem of agency. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15, 157-162.
6. Horgan, T. (2006). Is agentive experience veridical? Erkenntnis (this volume).
7. Horgan, T. (2007). Materialism: Matters of definition, defense and deconstruction. Paper for the workshop 'Physicalism and Beyond', GAP conference in Berlin, September 2006.
8. Horgan T., Tienson, J., & Graham, G. (2003). The phenomenology of first person agency. In S. Walter, & H. D. Heckmann (Eds.), Physicalism and mental causation: The metaphysics of mind and action (pp. 323-340). Imprint Academic.
9. Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism or something near enough. Princeton University Press.
10. Nida-Rümelin, M. (2006a). Der Blick von Innen. Zur transtemporalen Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag). English translation in preparation.
11. Nida-Rümelin, M. (2006b). Dualist emergentism. In B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary controversies in the philosophy of mind. Blackwell.
12. Nida-Rümelin, M. (2008). Experiencing subjects. In G. Bealer & R. Koons (Eds.), Waning of materialism. OUP.
13. O'Connor, T. (2000). Persons and causes: The metaphysics of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. O'Connor, T. (2002). Libertarian views: Dualist and agent-causal theories. In R. Kane (Ed.), The oxford handbook of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15. Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge University Press.
16. Wakefield, J., & Dreyfus, H. (1991). Intentionality and the phenomenology of action. In E. Lepore, & R. van Gulick (Eds.), John Searle and his critics (pp. 239-250). Oxford: Blackwell.
17. Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist, 54, 480-491.
18. Wegner, D. M. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.