Assertion, knowledge, and action

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 149, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 99-118

  Maitra, Ishani ^a   Weatherson, Brian ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Action; Assertion; Evidence; Knowledge; Luminosity; Moore's paradox

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952808546     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9542-z     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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