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Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 2761-2765

A reverse auction framework for access permission transaction to promote hybrid access in femtocell network

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISM; ACCESS PERMISSIONS; AUCTION DESIGN; AUCTION MODEL; BEST-EFFORT; HYBRID-ACCESS; LOW POWER; REVERSE AUCTION; SOCIAL WELFARE; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS; VCG MECHANISM; WIRELESS SERVICE PROVIDERS;

EID: 84861592689     PISSN: 0743166X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/INFCOM.2012.6195695     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (52)

References (12)
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    • IEEE
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    • A multi-winner cognitive spectrum auction framework with collusion-resistant mechanisms
    • IEEE
    • Y. Wu, B. Wang, K. Liu, and T. Clancy, "A multi-winner cognitive spectrum auction framework with collusion-resistant mechanisms," in Proceedings of DySPAN 2008. IEEE, pp. 1-9.
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  • 8
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  • 9
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.