The public utility pyramids

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 37-66

  Mahoney, Paul G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861591471     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/662994     Document Type: Article

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