An envirotechnical disaster: Nature, technology, and politics at fukushima

Environmental History

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 219-243

  Pritchard, Sara B ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DISASTER MANAGEMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR; NUCLEAR POWER PLANT; POLITICAL CHANGE; RADIOACTIVITY; RISK FACTOR;

FUKUSHIMA; HONSHU; JAPAN; TOHOKU;

EID: 84861355853     PISSN: 10845453     EISSN: 19308892     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/envhis/ems021     Document Type: Review

References (143)

1. The U.S. Geologic Survey concluded that the Tohoku earthquake, now called the "Great East Japan Earthquake," on March 11, 2011, was magnitude 9.0, although some newspaper accounts cite 8.9, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/ earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/usc0001xgp.php
2. David Biello refers to 14 meters ("Fukushima Meltdown Mitigation Aims to Prevent Radioactive Flood," Scientific American, June 24, 2011, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=fukushima-meltdown-radioactive- flood).
3. Charles Perrow quotes estimates ranging from 30 to 46 feet ("Fukushima, Risk, and Probability: Expect the Unexpected," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1, 2011)
4. aNew York Times journalist referenced 50 feet (Hiroku Tabuchi, "Company Believes 3 Reactors Melted Down in Japan," New York Times, May 24, 2011).
5. In June 2011, Japan's Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters declared that three reactors experienced full meltdowns (CNN Wire Staff, "3 Japan Nuclear Reactors Had Full Meltdown, Agency Says," June 6, 2011, http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/ 06/06/3-japan-nuclear-reactors-had-full- meltdown-agency-says/).
6. The following day, The Daily Yomiuri (Yomiuri Shimbun), a leading Japanese newspaper, expressed concern that the reactors had actually experienced "melt-throughs," which are more severe than core meltdowns and "the worst possibility in anuclear accident" ("'Melt-Through' at Fukushima? Govt Report to IAEA Suggests SituationWorse ThanMeltdown," The Yomiuri Shimbun, June 8, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/ T110607005367.htm).
7. See "Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety-The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations," 8 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/iaea- houkokusho-e.html.
8. The NewYork Times's"Status of theNuclear Reactors at the FukushimaDaiichi Power Plant," last updated April 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/03/16/world/asia/reactors-status.html? ref=earth.
9. See also the New York Times blogs during the early days of the crisis such as http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/ and http://thelede.blogs. nytimes.com/2011/03/12/ for more detailed coverage of events as they evolved.
10. See his essay, "A Hundred Days after Japan's Triple Disaster," East Asia Forum, June 20, 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/20/a- hundred-days-after-japan-s-triple-disaster/.
11. I emphasize "ever since" because Japan's atomic commission announced in late October 2011 that it may take more than three decades to clean up Fukushima (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/31/fukushima-nuclear- plant-30-years-cleanup).
12. see Ari Kelman, "Nature Bats Last: Some Recent Works on Technology and Urban Disaster," Technology and Culture 47 (2006): 391-402 (Pubitemid 44064227)
13. Ari Kelman, "Boundary Issues: Clarifying New Orleans's Murky Edges," Journal of American History 94 (2007): 695-703.
14. Joel A. Tarr, "There Will Be Gas," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 2, 2009, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09214/987834-109.stm.
15. On the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, see Christopher Jones, "Defining the Problem," posted to H-Energy, June 27, 2010, http://www.h-net.org/ ~energy/roundtables/Jones-Gulf.html
16. Peter Shulman, "A Catastrophic Accident of Normal Proportions," posted to H-Energy, June 27, 2010, http://www.h-net.org/~energy/roundtables/ Shulman-Gulf.html
17. Several other responses at http://aseh.net/teaching-research/ environmentalhistorians-respond-to-the-gulf-oil-spill/copy-of- ehresponsetoGulfOilSpill.pdf.
18. The Asia-Pacific Journal's forum on the triple disaster, http://www.japanfocus.org/Japans-3.11-Earthquake-Tsunami-Atomic-Meltdown.
19. See Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009)
20. Paul N. Edwards, "Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the History of Sociotechnical Systems," in Modernity and Technology, ed. Thomas Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 185-226
21. Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), especially 14-15 and Chapter 6.
22. On the relationship between fossil fuels and political systems, see Timothy Mitchell, "Carbon Democracy," Economy & Society 38, no. 3 (2009): 399-432; a much elaborated version is his more recent Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 2011).
23. For a few implications of the atomic age, see Stephen Bocking, "Ecosystems, Ecologists, and the Atom: Environmental Research at Oak Ridge National Laboratory," Journal of the History of Biology 28 (1995): 1-47
24. Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008).
25. For syntheses of literature at the intersection of environmental history and the history of technology, see Jeffrey K. Stine and Joel A. Tarr, "At the Intersection of Histories: Technology and the Environment," Technology and Culture 39 (1998): 601-40 (Pubitemid 128383567)
26. Martin Reuss and Stephen H. Cutcliffe, eds., The Illusory Boundary: Environment and Technology in History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010)
27. especially the introduction, afterword, and essay by Hugh S. Gorman and Betsy Mendelsohn, "Where Does Nature End and Culture Begin? Converging Themes in the History of Technology and Environmental History" (pp. 265-90)
28. Sara B. Pritchard, Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), introduction.
29. Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
30. See Paul N. Edwards, comments at "Infrastructure(s) and the Fukushima Earthquake: A Roundtable on Emergencies, Nuclear and Otherwise," annual meeting of the Society for the History of Technology, November 3-6, 2011.
31. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
32. See also his more recent book, The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
33. For a useful overview of Three Mile Island, see the U.S. Regulatory Commission fact sheet, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact- sheets/3mile-isle.html.
34. See also Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).
35. David E. Sanger and Matt Wald, "Radioactive Releases in Japan Could Last Months, Experts Say," New York Times, March 13, 2011.
36. Leo Marx, "Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept," Technology and Culture 51 (2010): 561-77. He published an earlier version of this article in Social Research in 1997.
37. Shulman "A Catastrophic Accident of Normal Proportions."
38. see William J. Broad, "From Afar, a Vivid Picture of Japan Crisis," New York Times, April 2, 2011. In addition, scholars in science and technology studies (STS) would critique this approach because it focuses on either technical or social issues, reifying the binary in the process. Moreover, reflecting other fundamental STS insights, how the problem gets framed shapes what solution(s) are possible and thus actionable.
39. For thoughts on this issue regarding the Deepwater Horizon, see Jones "Defining the Problem."
40. Hughes, Networks of Power.
41. Hughes, Networks of Power, 6.
42. J. R. McNeill, Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World (New York: Norton, 2000).
43. On copper, see Timothy J. LeCain, Mass Destruction: The Men and Giant Mines That Wired America and Scarred the Planet (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press 2009).
44. On harnessing rivers in different historical and national contexts, see Theodore Steinberg, Nature Incorporated: Industrialization and the Waters of New England (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
45. Richard White, The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995)
46. Mark Cioc, The Rhine: An Eco-Biography, 1815-2000 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002)
47. David Blackbourn, The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany (New York: Norton, 2006)
48. Pritchard, Confluence. 16 On the problem of agency, see Linda Nash, "The Agency of Nature and the Nature of Agency," Environmental History 10 (2005): 67-69.
49. Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas Parke Hughes, Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).
50. Perrow, Normal Accidents, 14, 296. Italics added.
51. see Clark A. Miller and Paul N. Edwards, Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001)
52. Spencer R. Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003)
53. Elizabeth Kolbert, Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature, and Climate Change (New York: Bloomsbury, 2006)
54. Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010).
55. Conevery Bolton Valenčius, The Health of the Country: How American Settlers Understood Themselves and Their Land (New York: Basic Books, 2002)
56. Barbara Allen, Uneasy Alchemy: Citizens and Experts in Louisiana's Chemical Corridor Disputes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003)
57. Gregg Mitman, Michelle Murphy, and Christopher Sellers, eds., Landscapes of Exposure: Knowledge and Illness in Modern Environments (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004)
58. Michelle Murphy, Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty: Environmental Politics, Technoscience, and Women Workers (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006)
59. Linda Nash, Inescapable Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006)
60. Gregg Mitman, Breathing Space: How Allergies Shape Our Lives and Landscapes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007)
61. Jody A. Roberts and Nancy Langston, "Toxic Bodies/Toxic Environments: An Interdisciplinary Forum," Environmental History 13 (2008): 629-703, and the related articles in this special issue
62. Sarah A. Vogel, "The Politics of Plastics: The Making and Unmaking of Bisphenol A 'Safety,'' American Journal of Public Health 99 (2009): 559-66
63. Nancy Langston, Toxic Bodies: Hormone Disruptors and the Legacy of DES (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010)
64. Joy Parr, Sensing Changes: Technologies, Environments, and the Everyday, 1953-2003 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010)
65. Brett Walker, Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011).
66. On hybrid landscapes, see White, Organic Machine; Mark Fiege, Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the American West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999)
67. Richard White, "From Wilderness to Hybrid Landscapes: The Cultural Turn in Environmental History," Historian 66 (2004): 557-64.
68. "Nature-culture" is from Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 7.
69. A related concept, "naturecultures," is from Donna J. Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003); 1
70. Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 16.
71. On vulnerability, see Wiebe E. Bijker, "Globalization and Vulnerability: Challenges and Opportunities for SHOT Around Its Fiftieth Anniversary," Technology and Culture 50 (2009): 600-12.
72. Hiroko Tabuchi and Matthew L. Wald, "Japanese Scramble to Avert Meltdowns as Nuclear Crisis Deepens After Quake," New York Times, March 12, 2011
73. Sanger and Wald, "Radioactive Releases." The phrase "Faustian bargain" is from Christine L. Marran, "Contamination: From Minamata to Fukushima," http://www.japanfocus.org/-Christine-Marran/ 3526.
74. Tabuchi andWald, "Japanese Scramble." The tsunami apparently flooded emergency diesel generators. Battery power provided a second backup, but those batteries died fairly quickly. On the staying power of "old" technologies, see David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
75. For useful historiographical overviews, see Stine and Tarr, "At the Intersection of Histories"; Reuss and Cutcliffe, eds., Illusory Boundary, introduction and afterword
76. Gorman and Mendelsohn, "Where Does Nature End and Culture Begin?" in Illusory Boundary.
77. Of course, managed and harnessed natures suggest how humans have interacted with and transformed "nonhuman" nature, thus further challenging the notion of a supposedly pristine nature without human influence. See Edmund Russell, "The Garden in the Machine: Toward an Evolutionary History of Technology," in Industrializing Organisms: Introducing Evolutionary History, ed. Philip Scranton and Susan R. Schrepfer (New York: Routledge, 2004).
78. See also specific examples in William Boyd, "Making Meat: Science, Technology, and American Poultry Production," Technology and Culture 42 (2001): 631-64
79. Robert Gardner, "Constructing a Technological Forest: Nature, Culture, and Tree-Planting in the Nebraska Sand Hills," Environmental History 14 (2009): 275-97
80. Ann Norton Greene, Horses at Work: Harnessing Power in Industrial America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008)
81. And many of the essays in Scranton and Schrepfer, eds., Industrializing Organisms, and Reuss and Cutcliffe, eds., Illusory Boundary.
82. For critiques of dichotomies and the articulation of cyborg, "naturecultures," and companion species, see the works of Donna Haraway, especially "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991), 149-81
83. Companion Species Manifesto; and When Species Meet. For an overview of actor network theory, see Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
84. See also Michel Callon, "Society in the Making: The Study of Technology as a Tool for Sociological Analysis," and John Law, "Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering," both in Social Construction of Technological Systems.
85. On mutual or coproduction, see Ronald R. Kline, Consumers in the Country: Technology and Social Change in Rural America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2000)
86. Sheila Jasanoff, ed., States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order (New York: Routledge, 2004).
87. See also Hughes, Human-Built World; LeCain, Mass Destruction; Gardner, "Constructing a Technological Forest"; Reuss and Cutcliffe, eds., Illusory Boundary; Mark Finlay, "Far Beyond Tractors: Envirotech and the Intersections of Technology, Agriculture, and the Environment," Technology and Culture 51, no. 2 (2010): 480-85.
88. During the crisis, some discussion focused on whether or not the reactors at Fukushima ran on a mixed fuel known as "mox," or mixed oxide, which includes reclaimed plutonium. If so, released steam could be more toxic than some other radioactive elements. Sanger and Wald, "Radioactive Releases."
89. For an overview, see Sanger and Wald, "Radioactive Releases."
90. Arthur F. McEvoy, "Working Environments: An Ecological Approach to Industrial Health and Safety," Technology and Culture 36 (1995): S145-72.
91. On the hidden history of the subcontracting system centered on short-term employment in the nuclear industry, including but not limited to Japan, see Gabrielle Hecht, "Nuclear Nomads: A Look at the Subcontracted Heroes," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 9, 2012. I say "usually" because "since the late 1980s," states Hecht, "some 90 percent of nuclear power plant workers in the country [Japan] have been subcontracted."
92. Perrow, "Fukushima, Risk, and Probability."
93. Hiroko Tabuchi and Matthew L. Wald, "Second Explosion at Reactor as Technicians Try to Contain Damage," New York Times, March 13, 2011.
94. Sanger andWald, "Radioactive Releases"
95. Sonja Schmid, "Both Better andWorse than Chernobyl," London Review of Books, March 17, 2011.
96. On gamma radiation, see Parr, Sensing Changes, 66-67. In May 2011, TEPCO workers were finally able to get close enough to reactor number 1 to fix a water gauge; once working, it showed that the water level in the reactor was much lower than expected, even with the massive infusion of seawater.
97. In fact, "one of the most startling findings announced Thursday was that water levels in the reactor vessel, which houses the fuel rods, appeared to be about three feet below where the bottom of the fuel rods would normally stand." Quotation from Hiroko Tabuchi and Matthew L. Wald, "Japanese Reactor Damage Is Worse Than Expected," New York Times, May 12, 2011.
98. Edgerton, Shock of the Old.
99. This description is based primarily on Sanger and Wald, "Radioactive Releases."
100. Quotations from Sanger and Wald, "Radioactive Releases."
101. Description of this process is drawn from Tabuchi and Wald, "Second Explosion"
102. Tabuchi and Wald, "Japanese Scramble"
103. Sanger and Wald, "Radioactive Releases"
104. Henry Fountain, "A Look at the Mechanics of a Partial Meltdown," New York Times, March 13, 2011.
105. Peter Behr, "Desperate Attempts to Save 3 Fukushima Reactors from Meltdown, New York Times, March 14, 2011.
106. At the same time, there was some concern that delays in water injections worsened the situation at Fukushima. I discuss this point briefly later, but see also Norimitsu Onishi and Martin Fackler, "In Nuclear Crisis, Crippling Mistrust," New York Times, June 12, 2011.
107. Stephen Hilgartner, "The Social Construction of Risk Objects: Or, How to Pry Open Networks of Risk," in Organizations, Uncertainties, and Risk, ed. James F. Short and Lee Clark (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
108. Quotation from Biello, "Fukushima Meltdown." Biello's naturalization of the toxic liquid is particularly unfortunate, given that government and corporate interests have worked to focus attention on the earthquake and tsunami alone. Nonetheless, given the long-standing importance of bathing rituals and hot springs in Japanese culture, including Shinto religious traditions, the extensive contaminated fluids within and now beyond Fukushima are likely freighted with meaning, from offending animistic spirits to possibly being hell on earth. Interestingly, however, the boundaries between "baths" and "natural" hot springs may be increasingly unclear in Japan because these springs are often highly managed and cultivated landscapes, which would further complicate interpretations of Fukushima's fluids as a toxic onsen. I thank John S. Harding for his critical insights here.
109. Biello, "Fukushima Meltdown"
110. Andrew Monahan, "Tokyo Electric Power Delays Dumping Water at Fukushima Daiichi Plant," Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2011
111. Marran, "Contamination."
112. Sanger and Wald, "Radioactive Releases."
113. On the explosions, see Behr, "Desperate Attempts" and especially Onishi and Fackler, "In Nuclear Crisis, Crippling Mistrust."
114. On vulnerability, see Bijker, "Globalization and Vulnerability."
115. Details regarding Fukushima workers are from Hecht, "Nuclear Nomads."
116. Apparently, on March 14 TEPCO's president asked Japan's prime minister Naoto Kan to allow the company to withdraw its employees from Fukushima Daiichi because it had become so dangerous. Kan refused and installed a trusted aide at the utility's headquarters the next morning. Some analysts have argued that closer government supervision altered the way TEPCO managed the crisis from that point forward. See Onishi and Fackler, "In Nuclear Crisis."
117. William Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature," in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed.William Cronon (New York: Norton, 1995).
118. See also Richard White's essay in that volume, "Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living? Work and Nature," especially 182.
119. Ted Steinberg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
120. Walker, Toxic Archipelago, especially 16-20.
121. The larger point here is that actors may strategically construct agency to suit their political (and perhaps legal) interests. This brief example suggests how historians can explore actors' conceptions of historical agency and causality in additionto developing their own theoretical approaches. For another example, this one focusing on the causes of hydrologic change in the Rhône valley amid postwar modernization efforts, see Pritchard, Confluence, Chapter 5. For analyzing technological determinism as an actor's move, see Gabrielle Hecht and Michael Thad Allen, eds., Technologies of Power; Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), introduction.
122. On the end of the Minamata court case, see Marran, "Contamination. "
123. Cornell Science & Technology Studies PhD candidate Tyson Vaughn was recently discussing hybrid causation and envirotechnical analysis with several people in Japan involved in the Minamata debate, including the curator of the Minamata Disease Municipal Museum, http://www.minamata195651.jp/guide-en.html
124. The curator of Soshisha ("The Supporting Center for Minamata Disease," http://soshisha.org/english/index-e.htm)
125. An NHK journalist, and "kataribe" (storyteller) Miyako Kawamoto, the widow of Teruo Kawamoto who had been the leader of one of the primary victims advocacy groups, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/22/world/teruo- kawamoto-victims-advocatein-mercury-outbreak.html.
126. Timothy S. George, Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002)
127. Walker, Toxic Archipelago, especially Chapter 5. For parallels between Minamata and Fukushima, see Marran, "Contamination."
128. Douglas R. Weiner, "A Death-Defying Attempt to Articulate a Coherent Definition of Environmental History," Environmental History 10 (2005): 404-20. (Pubitemid 41308750)
129. See Jake Hamblin's accompanying essay on the motif of nuclear safety. 60 "Nuclear Crisis: How It Happened, Safety Vows Forgotten, 'Safety Myth' Created," The Yomiuri Shimbun, June 15, 2011.
130. Perrow, "Fukushima, Risk, and Probability"
131. Onishi and Fackler, "In Nuclear Crisis."
132. Perrow, "Fukushima, Risk, and Probability."
133. However, on the contested notion and definition of "nuclearity, " see Gabrielle Hecht, "The Power of Nuclear Things," Technology and Culture 51 (2010): 1-30.
134. On falsified records and the (convenient) design of the spent fuel storage ponds, see Perrow, "Fukushima, Risk, and Probability."
135. Quotation from Behr, "Desperate Attempts."
136. Quotations from Norihiko Shirouzu, Phred Dvorak, Yuka Hayashi, and Andrew Morse, "Bid to 'Protect Assets' Slowed Reactor Fight," Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2011.
137. See also Ken Bradsher, Keith Belson, and Matthew L.Wald, "Executives May Have Lost Valuable Time at Damaged Nuclear Plant," New York Times, March 21, 2011.
138. For discussion of another aspect of the injection debate, specifically the conflict between TEPCO executives and the manager of reactor number 1, see Onishi and Fackler In Nuclear Crisis."
139. Paul Sutter, comment on J. R. McNeill's Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914, American Society for Environmental History (2011)
140. on hybrid causation specifically, see Walker, Toxic Archipelago.
141. Murphy, Sick Building Syndrome, 180.
142. Hughes, Networks of Power, 6.
143. Perrow, Normal Accidents, 296.