Contextualizing regimes: Institutionalization as a response to the limits of interpretation and policy engineering

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 110, Issue 7, 2012, Pages 1265-1308

  Sabel, Charles F ^a   Simon, William H ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

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EID: 84861113334     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (233)

1. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
2. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
3. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001).
4. Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 19-20, 224-32 (1921).
5. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995)
6. Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006)
7. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997)
8. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Proceeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015 (2004).
9. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009)
10. Accord Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2011) (affirming and elaborating Melendez-Diaz).
11. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
12. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43 (2004) (citations omitted).
13. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531-34.
14. Id. at 2550-2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
15. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
17. Id. at 63.
18. David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 39-44.
19. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
20. Erin Murphy argues that "second generation" scientific evidence, such as DNA identification, is even more removed from traditional percipient witness testimony than "first generation" scientific evidence, such as fingerprint identification. First-generation evidence often focuses around a complex judgment made by a single analyst, whereas the responsibility for second-generation evidence is more diffused and more dependent on centrally developed protocols, software, and databases.
21. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 721, 726-30 (2007).
22. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2547-55 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
23. In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011), the majority suggested that a "notice-and-demand" procedure would satisfy the Constitution. Under such a procedure, if the prosecution gives notice of intent to offer a forensic report, the defendant must make an affirmative demand for live testimony of an analyst or the right is waived. The court noted that "analysts testify in only a very small percentage of cases for it is unlikely that defense counsel will insist on live testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the forensic analysis."
24. Id. at 2718-2719 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. id. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("There is in the ordinary case... no good reason for defense counsel to waive the right of confrontation as the Court now interprets it.").
26. Nat'l Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 199-200 (2009). On accreditation in general.
27. id. at 193-215.
28. id. at 195-200, 215.
29. Murphy, supra note 14, at 776. Research confirms this point. Garrett and Neufield reviewed 137 transcripts of convicted defendants who were later exonerated and found that "invalid" forensic evidence played a role in eighty-two of the wrongful convictions.
30. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. R e v. 1, 12-14 (2009).
31. Id. at 13.
32. Yet "[d]efense counsel rarely cross-examined analysts concerning invalid testimony and rarely obtained experts on their own."
33. Id. at 2.
34. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
35. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) (alternation in original) (quoting a Massachusetts Department of Health official) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
37. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 17, at 186.
38. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-95 (1993).
39. Id. at 589.
40. Id. at 593-594.
41. The idea that constitutional criminal defense rights might be elaborated incrementally and experimentally is not novel. For example, Henry Monaghan pointed out some time ago that the Court's explanation of the exclusionary rule shifted after Mapp v. Ohio from the claim that exclusion was entailed interpretively by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to an instrumental claim that it was necessary to deter violations of the values underlying these Amendments.
42. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4-9 (1975).
43. He then argued that, from an instrumental rationale, the Court could not plausibly assume that exclusion would always and invariably be necessary.
44. id. at 9.
45. It follows from the instrumental view that the states should be free to try alternatives, and the Court should respect their efforts as long as they appear "minimally satisfactory."
46. id.
47. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (2006).
48. Henry M. Hart Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., Found. Press tent. ed. 1958).
49. Id. at 10-11.
50. Id. at 45-46.
51. id. at 11.
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. at 64-66.
55. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 875 (2003) (discussing and applying Hart and Sacks's institutionalism to questions of public law indeterminacy). Our ideas have been strongly influenced by discussions with Dorf.
56. Hart & Sacks, supra note 28, at 33-34.
57. Id. at 40.
58. Id. at 33-34.
59. Id. at 18 n.10 (discussing several since-repealed provisions of 7 C.F.R.).
60. Id. at 11.
61. Id. at 41-42, 44.
62. Id. at 47-53.
63. Id. at 63-64.
64. Hart and Sacks seem to have discounted the possibility that private initiative can sometimes be sufficient, though the trade association scholarship shows that it can. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1724-25 (discussing the cotton gin industry). The key determinants of the need for public intervention appear to be the number and heterogeneity of the stakeholders.
65. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons 15-21, 182-85 (1990).
66. Hart & Sacks, supra note 28, at 8-9.
67. 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(1), 601(m)(4) (2006).
68. Id. §§ 601(m)(3), 606(a) (defining "adulterated" and prohibiting adulterated meat respectively).
69. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 102(b)(1), 124 Stat. 3885, 3887 (2011) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 350d(b)(1) (2006)).
70. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & Soc'y Rev. 691, 696-98 (2003).
71. Sanitation Requirements for Official Meat and Poultry Establishments, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,045, 45,047-48 (Aug. 25, 1997) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 303, 308, 381, 416) (describing and repealing various highly directive regulations).
72. Hart and Sacks note as a potential problem that the Cladosporium Rot was not visible in its early stage. The problem was not intractable in the cantaloupes case because, since the disease was "of field origin," its presence at the time of shipment-the relevant time under applicable contract law-could be inferred from its discovery on arrival. Hart & Sacks, supra note 28, at 11.
73. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 49, at 689 (describing "management-based" regulation).
74. Comm. on the Review of the Use of Scientific Criteria & Performance Standards for Safe Food, Nat'l Research Council, Scientific Criteria to Ensure Safe Food 140-41 (2003).
75. Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
76. State of Cal. Dep't of Food & Agric., California Leafy Green Products Handler Marketing Agreement (effective as amended from Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter California Marketing Agreement], available at http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/mkt/mkt/pdf/ CA%20Leafy%20Green%20Products%20Handler%20Agreement.pdf.
77. Julie Schmit, All Bacteria May Not Come Out in the Wash, USA To d ay. c o m, Oct. 5, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2006-10-04-spinach-wash-usat_x.htm (discussing the 2006 outbreak and the special concerns with eating raw spinach).
78. Marian Burros, Government Offers Guidelines to Fresh-Food Industry, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2007, at A17. The agency also pointed to insufficient enforcement resources.
79. Id.
80. About Us, Cal. Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg. Bd., www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 21, 2012); Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 58745 (West 2012).
81. Western Growers Ass'n, Justification for Proposed National Marketing Agreement for Leafy Green Vegetables, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5077207.
82. Variun Shekhur, Produce Exception-alism: Examining the Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Its Ability to Improve Food Safety, 6 J. Food L. & Pol'y 267 (2010).
83. California Marketing Agreement, supra note 55, art. III.
84. Import Requirements for Leafy Green Vegetables from U.S. and California, Can. Food Inspection Agency (issued May 4, 2007, amended May 31, 2007), http:// www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/frefra/safsal/califore.shtml
85. Mexico Opens Border to State Spinach, Cal. Farmer (Dec. 21, 2007), http://farmprogress.com/california-farmer/ story.aspx?s=14911&c=9.
86. There are many certification regimes for other products, and there is even another major regime that includes leafy greens. This is the Safe Quality Food program sponsored by some major retailers, including Wal-Mart and McDonald's. Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, 32d Session, Jun. 29-Jul. 4, 2009.
87. The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II 4-5 (May 2009) (by Spencer Hensen & John Humphrey).
88. California Marketing Agreement, supra note 55, art. V. See generally, Cal. Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg. Bd., Commodity Specific Food Safety Guidelines for the Production and Harvest of Lettuce and Leafy Greens (Jul. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Food Safety Guidelines], available at http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/ sites/default/files/LGMA%20Accepted%20Food%20Safety%20Practices%207.22.11.pdf (containing various provisions that impose record-keeping requirements on signatory handlers for purposes of traceability).
89. Food Safety Guidelines, supra note 62, at 49. 400 feet is a minimum. Distance should reflect a series of "risk/mitigation" factors, such as the slope of the terrain.
90. Burros, supra note 57.
91. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProduct s/UCM169112.pdf.
92. Produce Safety from Production to Consumption: 2004 Action Plan to Minimize Foodborne Illness Associated with Fresh Product Consumption, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Oct. 2004), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-SpecificInformation/FruitsVegetablesJuices/FDAProduceSafetyActivities/ProduceSafetyActionPlan/UCM129487.htm.
93. Testimony of Chris Blanchard, Owner, Rock Spring Farm (Iowa), to the U.S. Dep't of Agric., Public Hearing in the Matter of Leafy Green Vegetables Handled in the United States 2337-2356 (Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5080524 (stating that low levels of E. coli have been detected in deer feces).
94. However, the LGMA guidelines do take account of some such factors. The guideline for land with "grazing domestic livestock" (as opposed to confined commercial livestock) is thirty feet (as opposed to 400 feet). Cal. Leafy Greens Mktg. Bd., Audit Checklist 2 (July 23, 2010), available at http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/sites/default/files/ Audit%20Checklist%20California%207-23-10.pdf.
95. Christophe Charlier & Egizio Valceschini, Coordination for Traceability in the Food Chain: A Critical Appraisal of European Regulation, 25 Eur. L. J. Econ. 1, 13-14 (2008) (analyzing the coordination barriers to effective private trace-back monitoring and arguing that downstream actors are more likely to play the necessary leadership role in organizing effective initiatives).
96. Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy 179-254 (2001).
97. Telephone Interview with Scott Horsfall, Chief Exec. Officer, Cal. Leafy Greens Prods. Handler Mktg. Agreement (June 25, 2010).
98. Kalypso Nicolaides & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs., 263, 293-94 (Summer 2005).
99. Public agency participation at both federal and state levels involves agriculture, public health, and environmental officials. Many food safety standards draw on or interact with environmental standards. For example, LGMA water standards incorporate standards promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water Act. Cal. Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg. Agreement, Appendix B: Technical Basis Document for Commodity Specific Food Safety Guidelines for the Lettuce and Leafy Greens Supply Chain 2nd Edition 2-4 (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/sites/default/files/ appendix_b_technical_basis.pdf. Some LGMA standards create tensions with environmental ones that require negotiation. For example, settling ponds that filter sediment improve water quality but attract animals that might contaminate nearby crops.
100. WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 15, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493.
101. Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 41-75 (2007).
102. Generally Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, supra note 61.
103. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, §§ 102-05, 201-05, 301-07, 124 Stat. 3885-905, 3923-39, 3953-66 (2011).
104. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA, USDA, Cornell University Announce Alliance for Produce Safety (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/ NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm232503.htm.
105. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979)
106. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
107. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 374, 390-402 (2007). Our analysis relies extensively on Johnson's article.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006)
109. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1, 38-41 (1996) (suggesting that "reasonable accommodation" is implicit in discrimination doctrine outside the disabilities area).
110. Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 251, 258 (2011)
111. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner's Canary 11-14 (2002)
112. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001).
113. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006)); Act of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, 106 Stat. 4982 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (2006)).
114. Johnson, supra note 78, at 402-403.
115. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006).
117. Id. § 5633(a).
118. Johnson, supra note 78, at 403. Congress took note of this supply chain in 2002, when it replaced the focus of the original statute on "disproportionate minority confinement" with a focus on "disproportionate minority contacts" within the juvenile justice system. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22).
119. 28 C.F.R. 31.303(j) (2011). The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention ("OJJDP") does not normally publish jurisdiction-specific data, but the Heywood W. Burns Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity has obtained some of this data from the OJJDP and published that data on its website. State Map, The Heywood W. Burns Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity, http://www.burnsinstitute.org/ state_map.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
120. See generally Cases, Youth Law Center, http://www.ylc.org/ylcInAction.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2012)
121. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, The Annie E. Casey Foundation, http://www.aecf.org/MajorInitiatives/JuvenileDetentionAlternativesInitiative.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
122. Johnson, supra note 78, at 410 (citations omitted).
123. Specifically: [The 73 sites reporting] had a total average detention population of 5,451 in the year prior to each site joining JDAI and 3,967 in 2007-representing a 27 percent cumulative reduction in average daily population as of 2007. Thirty-six of the reporting sites (49 percent) had total population reductions of 25 percent or more, and those high performing sites had a median population reduction of 39 percent.
124. The Annie E. Casey Found., Two Decades of JDAI: From Demonstration Project to National Standard 14 (2009) [hereinafter The Annie E. Casey Found., Two Decades].
125. id. at 19 ("[T]here is no evidence that JDAI has led to any increases in offending in the short-term while youth who might otherwise be detained are supervised in the community").
126. Eleanor Hinson Hoytt et al., The Annie E. Casey Found., Reducing Racial Disparities in Juvenile Detention: 8 Pathways to Juvenile Detention Reform (2001), available at http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/reducing% 20racial%20disparities.pdf.
127. http://www.jdaihelpdesk.org.
128. Jeffrey A. Butts & Douglas N. Evans, John Jay Coll. of Criminal Justice, Resolution, Reinvestment, and Realignment: Three Strategies for Changing Juvenile Justice 1-2 (2011), available at http://johnjayresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 09/rec20111.pdf.
129. A study by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency of the period 1994-1998 found that, while juvenile detention decreased in JDAI sites, it increased in fourteen comparison sites. Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinquency, NCCD Evaluation of JDAI (Feb. 2002) (unpublished draft) (on file with authors). There has been no independent assessment of JDAI since then, but one by the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy at the UC Berkeley School of Law is underway.
130. Impact Evaluation of the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/11130.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
131. Scott MacDonald & Todd Foglesong, The Role of Probation in Reducing Minority Youth Confinement: Detention Reform and Justice Development in Santa Cruz County, 1990- 2008 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
132. Hoytt et al., supra note 90, at 38, 50-51, 59-60.
133. David Steinhart, The Annie E. Casey Found., Juvenile Detention Risk Assessment: A Practice Guide to Juvenile Detention Reform 19 (2006), available at http://www.jdaihelpdesk.org/Docs/Documents/Objective%20Admissions%20Criteria%20and%20Instruments/Juvenile%20Detention%20Risk%20Assessment/Practice%20Guide%2 0to%20Juvenile%20Detention%20Risk%20Assessment.pdf.
134. Hoytt et al., supra note 90, at 57.
135. Richard Jensen, Nat'l. Model Site Adm'r., Multnomah Cnty. Juvenile Detention Reform Initiative (Aug. 12, 2011).
136. The Annie E. Casey Found., Two Decades, supra note 90, at 23.
137. Huckleberry Community Assessment & Referral Center, Annual Report July 1, 2008-June 30, 2009, at 1, http://www.sfgov3.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/ juvprobation/meetings/Full_Commission/supporting/2010/03-10-10_Huckleberry_CARC_ Update_handout.pdf.
138. Sustained community involvement is promoted and facilitated in some areas by the Haywood Burns Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity.
139. James Bell et al., W. Haywood Burns Inst., The Keeper and the Kept: Reflections on Local Obstacles to Disparities Reduction in Juvenile Justice Systems and a Path to Change (2009), available at www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/BI%20Keeper%20Kept.pdf.
140. Johnson, supra note 78, at 415.
141. Steinhart, supra note 94, at 68-69.
142. Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 11-17 (1999).
143. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361(2), 1362(1)(A), 1371(a)(3)(B) (2006). See generally Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1423h (2006).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
145. Tim Gerrodette & Douglas P. DeMaster, Quantitative Determination of Optimum Sustainable Population, 6 Marine Mammal Sci. 1, 1-2 (1990).
146. Parker, supra note 101, at 6.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 19.
149. Id. at 29.
150. Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Act, Pub. L. No. 98-364, 98 Stat. 440 (1984) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (2006)).
151. Parker, supra note 101, at 21-25 (describing the creation and functioning of the IATTC).
152. Id. at 24.
153. Id. at 31.
154. Id. at 29.
155. Id. at 52 n.235.
156. Id. at 27-29.
157. Id. at 33-34.
158. Betsy Carpenter, What Price Dolphin?, U.S. News & World Rep., June 13, 1994, at 71.
159. Apparently, the differential effect on immature tuna and other species is due to the facts that dolphin sets induce the tuna to move faster prior to netting and the junior tuna and other species don't keep up with the adult tuna. Id. A World Trade Organization panel found that harm to dolphins may also occur in sets that do not involve deliberate encirclement. Panel Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 7.531, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011), at 248 [hereinafter WTO Panel Report].
160. Parker, supra note 101, at 47-53.
161. Id. at 47-48, 53-54.
162. Id. at 47-58.
163. International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-42, 111 Stat. 1122, 1123-24 (1997) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (2006)).
164. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24 (2011).
165. Id. § 216.91(a)(2)(i).
166. IATTC favors a definition of "dolphin-safe" as tuna caught in sets where there were no observed dolphin deaths, and its tracking system is designed to identify such tuna reliably. Congress had adopted the "no-encirclement" definition in 1990. See Bower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the enactment of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006)). Pursuant to one of the international dolphin conservation agreements, Congress in 1997 directed the Secretary of Commerce to change to the "no observed mortality" definition if he found, after researching the matter, that encirclement did not have a "significant adverse effect on any depleted dolphin stock."
167. id. at 1061-1062.
168. The evidence turned out to be inconclusive. Despite lower mortality, dolphin stocks did not recover in the years immediately following the conservation program. It was a matter of controversy whether failure was due to nonfatal harm from tuna fishing or some undetected ecological change.
169. id. at 1062-1063.
170. Despite this uncertainty, the Secretary sought to move to the "no observed mortality" definition, but the courts reversed his decision in litigation brought by environmental groups.
171. id. at 1071
172. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations: Tuna Purse Seine Vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP), 69 Fed. Reg. 55288-89 (Sept. 13, 2004)
173. Paul R. Wade et al., Depletion of Spotted and Spinner Dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific: Modeling Hypotheses for their Lack of Recovery, 343 Marine Ecology Progress Series, Aug. 7, 2007, at 1, 12.
174. Tim Gerrodette et al., Nat'l Ocean & Atmospheric Admin., Estimates of 2006 Dolphin Abundance in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (2008) (technical memorandum).
175. WTO Panel Report, supra note 117, at 206-63.
176. The WTO panel held the labeling policy to violate article 2.2 of the Agreement, which prohibits technical regulations that are "more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective".
177. Id. at 206
178. Inter-Am. Tropical Tuna Comm'n, Executive Report on the Functioning of the AIDCP in 2008, at 1, available at http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/ExecutiveReports/ 2008-AIDCP-Executive-Report.pdf
179. Parker, supra note 101, at 52 n.235. Parker finds that the IATTC reports are credible.
180. Parker, supra note 101, at 48-49 n.218.
181. Parker, supra note 101, at 56 n.256.
182. id. at 39-40.
183. id. at 44-46.
184. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (2006).
185. Id. § 1371(a)(3)(B).
186. Kathleen Noonan, Charles F. Sabel, & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 Law & Soc. Inquiry 523 (2009).
187. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 247 (2011).
188. Bernstein, supra note 2.
189. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 4, at 13-15.
190. Parker, supra note 101, at 28, 47.
191. Hart & Sacks, supra note 28, at 331-39.
192. The nondelegation doctrine operates to preclude prospective delegation of lawmak-ing authority to private organizations. See, e.g., Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 86-89 (3d Cir. 1984).
193. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)
194. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
195. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (requiring that agency norms be published in the Federal Register before a person can "in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by" them); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972) (holding that constitutional due process requires "fair notice" of obligations as prerequisite to criminal sanction); Braden v. Workman, 380 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding private standards admissible as evidence of tort standard of care only if "notorious"); Am. Nat'l Standards Inst., ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American National Standards § 4.5 (2010) (requiring, as condition of approval as an "American national standard," that the standard be published).
196. Lawrence Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmak-ing and the Case of Accounting, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (2005).
197. While standard-setters generally publicize summaries of their output, they sometimes limit distribution of the full versions so that they can earn money by charging for it. Cunningham criticizes this practice.
198. Id. at 324.
199. Mary Graham, Democracy by Disclosure (2002).
200. Nursing Home Compare, Medicare.gov, http://www.medicare.gov/nhcompare (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
201. National Disproportionate Minority Contact Databook, Office of Juvenile Justice & Deliquency Prevention, http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/dmcdb/index.html.
202. Joseph Rees, Hostages of Each Other 94-96, 104-05, 118-20 (1996).
203. Am. Nat'l Standards Inst., supra note 140, § 1.1.
204. Id. §§ 1.1-1.3, 2.1-2.3. The one-half or one-third standard is described as a "historical" benchmark used as a "normative policy".
205. Id. §§ 2.1, 2.0.
206. A related principle at the international level is the trade law doctrine that holds that a nation sometimes may not enforce a regulation with strong trade-restrictive effects unless it has first engaged exporting nations in an effort to find a mutually acceptable arrangement.
207. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 491, 504-11 (2002).
208. Ross E. Cheit, Setting Safety Standards 176-79 (1990).
209. Inter-Am. Tropical Tuna Comm'n, Rules of Procedure, r. IV
210. www.IATTC.org/PDFFiles/Rules%20of%20ProceduresENG.pdf (last updated Aug. 22, 2011).
211. Food Safety Guidelines, supra note 62, at 9.
212. ANSI requires a vote that provides "evidence of consensus" and suggests that a two-thirds vote (with a quorum of at least half of the membership) is an "example" of such evidence. Am. Nat'l Standards Inst., supra note 140, § 2.7.
213. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
214. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509-10
215. Dell Computers, Inc., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996) (adopting the same posture in an FTC proceeding).
216. Thus, in "The Case of the Unworthy Tugs," they approve of the court's refusal to enforce an industry custom where it reliably determined that "a calling... [had] unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices." Hart & Sacks, supra note 28, at 403- 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). In "The Case of the Bankers Accustomed to Doing What They Pleased," they approve of the court's disregard of an industry custom where it determined that the defendant had invoked the custom opportunistically to frustrate the plaintiff's reasonable expectations.
217. Id. at 415-434.
218. Am. Nat'l Standards Inst., supra note 140, § 4.7.2.
219. Courts have occasionally treated duties to monitor and reassess implementation as implicit in substantive statutory norms. See, e.g., R.C. ex rel. The Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Walley, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (terminating an injunction against child welfare officials after concluding that monitoring and reassessment procedures were adequate). This case is also discussed in Noonan et al., supra note 132, at 549-51.
220. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 17, at 197.
221. Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting Organizations: A Case Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1393 (2004).
222. California Marketing Act, Cal. Food & Agric. Code §§ 58601-59293 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 745 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and all 2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.).
223. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1638d (2006).
224. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-119 Revised (1998), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119.
225. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973), available at 1973 WL 149263.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(f) (2006).
227. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006).
228. WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493.
229. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70a (2006).
230. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
231. Amy A. Marasco, Standards Development: Are You at Risk?, Am. Nat'l Standards Inst., http://www.ansi.org/news_publications/other_documents/risk.aspx?menuid=7 (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
232. Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 757, 784-85 (2005).
233. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1302 (1976).