Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them have a history)? a bourdieuian approach to understanding emotion

History and Theory

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 193-220

  Scheer, Monique ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Emotional practices; Emotives; Habitus; History of emotions; History of the self; Pierre Bourdieu; Practice theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860768297     PISSN: 00182656     EISSN: 14682303     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00621.x     Document Type: Review

References (141)

1. This article would not have come into being without the intense intellectual exchange I enjoyed with many colleagues and visiting scholars at the Center for the History of Emotions at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, for which I am very grateful. I also thank the members of the Amsterdam Center for Cross-Disciplinary Emotion and Sensory Studies for discussing parts of this paper with me, and those who read it and gave me valuable comments: Juliane Brauer, Ute Frevert, Benno Gammerl, Bettina Hitzer, Uffa Jensen, Anja Laukötter, Kaspar Maase, Stephanie Olsen, Margrit Pernau, Jan Plamper, Joseph Prestel, Bill Reddy, Anne Schmidt, and Tine van Osselaer. I also thank Clara Polley and Friederike Schmidt for their excellent research assistance. Most especially, I thank Pascal Eitler, whose invitation to collaborate on an article on emotions and the body was the first step toward developing the ideas in this article (Pascal Eitler and Monique Scheer, "Emotionengeschichte als Körpergeschichte: Eine heuristische Perspektive auf religiöse Konversionen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 35 [2009], 282-313).
2. This could also be said of other central concepts of Pierre Bourdieu's practice theory, such as "emotional fields" or "emotional capital." There are exceptions: on the latter term, see Michalinos Zembylas, "Emotional Capital and Education: Theoretical Insights from Bourdieu," British Journal of Educational Studies 55 (2007) 443-463.
3. The term "emotional habitus" has also received some theoretical attention, though I find it somewhat problematic because it is either redundant or implicitly divides the habitus in a way that runs counter to Bourdieu's theory. See Gesa Stedman, Stemming the Torrent: Expression and Control in the Victorian Discourses on Emotion, 1830-1872 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002);
4. Eva Illouz, Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007)
5. and idem, Saving the Modern Soul: Therapy, Emotions, and the Culture of Self-Help (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
6. See also Habitus in Habitat I: Emotion and Motion, ed. Sabine Flach, Daniel Margulies, and Jan Söffner (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), 7-22
7. And Deborah B. Gould, Moving Politics:Emotion and ACT UP's Fight against AIDS (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 34-42.
8. The sociologist Norman K. Denzin uses the term "emotional practice" in On Understanding Emotion (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984), 89, but his argument proceeds from philosophical phenomenology, not practice theory.
9. Robert C. Solomon, True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 155, 157.
10. William James, "What is an Emotion?" Mind 9 (1884), 188-205.
11. Antonio R. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2003).
12. In philosophy, see Robert C. Solomon, The Passions (New York: Doubleday, 1976)
13. And Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
14. Appraisal theory in psychology has been developed by Nico H. Frijda; see his The Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
15. Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," American Historical Review 107 (2002), 821-845.
16. For example, Arlie R. Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983);
17. Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel Markus, Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1994);
18. Niklas Luhmann, Liebe als Passion: Zur Codierung von Intimität (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982).
19. Catherine A. Lutz and Geoffrey M. White, "The Anthropology of Emotions," Annual Review of Anthropology 15 (1986), 405-436.
20. Catherine A. Lutz, Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988 ), 5.
21. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Margaret M. Lock, "The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future Work in Medical Anthropology," Medical Anthropology Quarterly 1 (1987), 6-41;
22. Margot L. Lyon and John M. Barbalet, "Society's Body: Emotion and the 'Somatization' of Social Theory," in Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self, ed. Thomas J. Csordas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 48-67;
23. John Leavitt, "Meaning and Feeling in the Anthropology of Emotions," American Ethnologist 23 (1996), 514-539;
24. Margot L. Lyon, "The Material Body, Social Processes and Emotion: 'Techniques of the Body' Revisited," Body & Society 3 (1997), 83-101.
25. Language and the Politics of Emotion, ed. Catherine A. Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
26. For example, C. Stephen Jaeger, "Emotions and Sensibilities: Some Preluding Thoughts," in Codierungen von Emotionen im Mittelalter, ed. C. Stephen Jaeger and Ingrid Kasten (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), vii-xii, in which the author distinguishes between emotions and sensibilities and claims that only the latter can be studied by historians, as the former are "private sensations" that "would appear not to have any history, to be primal, natural, instinctual, and unchangingly nebulous."
27. The most influential argument in this regard is Peter Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, "Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards," American Historical Review 90 (1985), 813-836.
28. See also Jan Plamper, "The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns," History and Theory 49 (2010), 237-265, esp. Rosenwein's remarks (258-260) and Stearns's comment (262).
29. See the seminal paper by Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," Analysis 58 (1998), 7-19.
30. Alva Noë, Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009 ), 10.
31. William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (New York: Holt, 1890). Though he acknowledges that all organic tissue is to some extent capable of "yielding," changing form and organization without losing structure completely, he emphasizes the particular "aptitude of the brain for acquiring habits" (103) and the "extraordinary degree" of plasticity of nervous tissue in the body (105), seeing in these the material basis of consciousness.
32. Margaret Wilson, "Six Views of Embodied Cognition," Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (2002), 625-636.
33. Lawrence W. Barsalou, "Grounded Cognition," Annual Review of Psychology 59 (2008), 617-645.
34. Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
35. For an overview, see The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, ed. Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
36. Work at the intersection of anthropology and cognitive science also contributes to this paradigm; see, for example, Jean Lave, Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics and Culture in Everyday Life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
37. See, for example, Keith Oatley, "The Sentiments and Beliefs of Distributed Cognition," in How Feelings Influence Thoughts: Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction, ed. Nico H. Frijda, Antony S. R. Manstead, and Sascha Bem (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 78-107;
38. Paula M. Niedenthal, "Embodying Emotion," Science 316 (2007), 1002-1005;
39. Paula M. Niedenthal and Marcus Maringer, "Embodied Emotion Considered," Emotion Review 1 (2009), 122-128.
40. Paul E. Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino, "Emotions in the Wild: The Situated Perspective on Emotion," in Robbins and Aydede, eds., Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, 438.
41. Griffiths and Scarantino, "Emotions in the Wild," 437-438.
42. I choose not to use the term "affect" because it refers to only part of the physiological-psychological- social complex of emotion, singling it out as somehow more significant than the other aspects and running the risk of reductionism. More specifically, "affect" denotes the precultural "first step" in an emotional process conceived of as linear (from affect/sensation through cultural signification to emotion), whereas I am promoting a model of emotional response based on John Dewey's notion of a circuit (see below). For a cogent critique of the "affect" concept in recent cultural theory, see Ruth Leys, "The Turn to Affect: A Critique," Critical Inquiry 37 (Spring 2011), 434-472.
43. See James, "What is an Emotion?" 193-194
44. And Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 86-87, where he distinguishes between thought and feeling by virtue of the brain's representations of the body involved in perception, thus causing us to say "I feel happy" and not "I think happy." This is, of course, possible only in languages in which a clear distinction is made between "thought" and "emotion," which does not seem to be the case, for example, in Bali
45. (see Unni Wikan, "Toward an Experience-near Anthropology," Cultural Anthropology 6 [1991], 285-305). Be that as it may, in the interest of clarifying terms for a history that presupposes a distinct object called "emotion," I will make the distinction in order to clarify my usage.
46. William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
47. Reddy addresses Wittgensteinian concepts closely related to ones developed in practice theory in his "Emotional Styles and Modern Forms of Life," in Sexualized Brains: Scientific Modeling of Emotional Intelligence from a Cultural Perspective, ed. Nicole Karafyllis and Gotlind Ulshöfer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 81-100.
48. He briefly discusses the compatibility of findings in cognitive neuroscience with the work of practice theorists such as Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, William Sewell, and Sherry Ortner in this article, as well as in his "Saying Something New: Practice Theory and Cognitive Neuroscience," Arcadia 44 (2009), 8-23.
49. One of the more direct discussions of the implications of practice theory for the study of emotion has been offered by the sociologist Andreas Reckwitz. See his Das hybride Subjekt: Eine Theorie der Subjektkulturen von der bürgerlichen Moderne zur Postmoderne (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2006).
50. On emotion in particular, see idem, "Umkämpfte Maskulinität: Zur Transformation männlicher Subjektformen und ihrer Affektivitäten," in Die Präsenz der Gefühle. Männlichkeit und Emotion in der Moderne, ed. Manuel Borutta and Nina Verheyen (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), 57-79
51. And Fay Bound Alberti, "Medical History and Emotion Theory," in Medicine, Emotion and Disease, 1700-1950, ed. Fay Bound Alberti (Houndmills, UK, and New York: Palgrave, 2006), xiii-xxix, esp. xvii-xviii.
52. Other important contributions to a practice approach include Sherry B. Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties," Comparative Studies in Society and History 26 (1984), 126-166;
53. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984);
54. Theodore R. Schatzki, Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
55. And The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, ed. Theodore Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (New York: Routledge, 2001).
56. Andreas Reckwitz, "Basic Elements of a Theory of Social Practices: A Perspective in Social Theory," Zeitschrift für Soziologie 32 (2003), 296 (my translation).
57. This German-language article is a more detailed version of Andreas Reckwitz, "Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing," European Journal of Social Theory 5 (2002), 245-265.
58. Joseph Rouse, "Practice Theory," in Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, ed. Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard, and John Woods, vol. 15 of Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology, ed. Stephen Turner and Mark Risjord (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006), 499.
59. Cf. Reckwitz, "Toward a Theory," 249-251.
60. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989);
61. Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present, ed. Ray Porter (London: Routledge, 1997).
62. Scheper-Hughes and Lock, "The Mindful Body." See also the illuminating essay by Thomas J. Csordas, "Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology," Ethos 18 (1990), 5-47.
63. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 53-54.
64. Defining emotions as involuntary reflexes has a long history beginning with Charles Darwin's Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (1872).
65. Silvan Tomkins's definition of emotions as "affect programs" belong to this tradition (Affect Imagery Consciousness, vols. 1-4 [New York: Springer, 1962-1992])
66. As does Paul Ekman's study of involuntary, universal facial expressions (Emotion in the Human Face: Guidelines for Research and an Integration of Findings [New York: Pergamon, 1972]).
67. As Reddy has pointed out (Navigation of Feeling, 55), there are psychologists who have defined emotions as automatized cognitive habits: Alice M. Isen and Gregory A. Diamond, "Affect and Automaticity," in Unintended Thought: Limits of Awareness, Intention and Control, ed. James B. Uleman and J. A. Bargh (New York: Guilford Press, 1989), 124-152.
68. Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 136-137, where he speaks of "learning in the sense of a selective, durable transformation of the body through the reinforcement or weakening of synaptic connections." William James cites in this regard the biological axiom "la fonction fait l'organe" (Principles, I, 109).
69. Some studies on the effects of muscular training and practice on brain anatomy include Sara L. Bengtsson et al., "Extensive Piano Practicing Has Regionally Specific Effects on White Matter Development," Nature Neuroscience 8 (2005), 1148-1150;
70. Bogdan Draganski et al., "Neuroplasticity: Changes in Grey Matter Induced by Training," Nature 427 (2004), 311-312. Recent research into the physical effects of meditation practices suggests that attention distribution may also leave material traces in brain structures.
71. See Britta K. Hölzel et al., "Mindfulness Practice Leads to Increases in Regional Brain Gray Matter Density," Psychiatry Research 191, no. 1 (2011), 36-43;
72. And A. Chiesa and A. Serretti, "A Systematic Review of Neurobiological and Clinical Features of Mindfulness Meditations," Psychological Medicine 40, no. 8 (2010), 1239-1252.
73. Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 66.
74. Cf. Pierre Lamaison and Pierre Bourdieu, "From Rules to Strategies: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu," Cultural Anthropology 1 (1986), 110-120.
75. Sherry Ortner, High Religion: A Cultural and Political History of Sherpa Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 198.
76. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 58-59. "Tactics" refer in de Certeau's work to the "art of the weak," a kind of subversive trickery, a locus for creativity and resistance in the face of the grand "strategies" of subjects and institutions with "will and power" (36-37).
77. In so doing, Bourdieu's theory tends to ascribe a political orientation to the body, like that of William James, who called habit society's "most precious conservative agent...[which] keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance" (Principles, I, 121). Bourdieu has also been taken to task for his ethnographic representation of Kabyle society, central to the development of his concept of habitus; cf. Herman Roodenburg, "Pierre Bourdieu: Issues of Embodiment and Authenticity," Etnofoor 17 (2005), 215-226.
78. See the critical discussion of Bourdieu's habitus concept in David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 95-116
79. And in Bernard Lahire, The Plural Actor (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010). Lahire has developed more fully the notion of the "multi-socialized and multi-determined individual" confronted with a plurality of contexts in which to deploy behaviors and practices on the basis of Bourdieu's habitus theory. He argues for a social analysis that is at once " dispositional" and "contextual" (x-xi).
80. Judith Butler similarly argues that agency is radically conditioned by society, but is not fully constrained by it; see her The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 15.
81. As Erving Goffmann once said: "When they issue uniforms, they issue skins," to which Arlie Hochschild added "and two inches of flesh." See Arlie Russell Hochschild, "Emotion Work, Feelings Rules, and Social Structure," American Journal of Sociology 85 (1979) 556
82. citing Erving Goffmann, Frame Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
83. The subversive potential of repetitive practices is more strongly articulated in Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990)
84. And idem, Bodies That Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993) than in Bourdieu's work.
85. Cf. Reckwitz, "Basic Elements," 296.
86. Diana Coole, "Rethinking Agency: A Phenomenological Approach to Embodiment and Agentic Capacities," Political Studies 53 (2005), 130.
87. This may explain why his theory has been largely neglected by anthropologists and sociolo gists of emotion. The anthropologist Deborah Reed-Danahay has discussed the place of emotion in Bourdieu's concept of habitus in her Locating Bourdieu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 99-128. She points out its connections with his examinations of taste and the nexus of economic interest and affective ties in families.
88. Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 142.
89. Pierre Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, transl. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 38.
90. Michelle Z. Rosaldo, "Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling," in Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion, ed. Richard A. Shweder and Robert A. LeVine (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 137-157, esp. 143: "embodied thoughts [are] thoughts seeped with the apprehension that 'I am involved'," a statement that appears to draw on a phenomenologically inspired stance comparable to Bourdieu's.
91. How volition is construed and experienced across cultures is explored in Toward an Anthropology of the Will, ed. Keith M. Murphy and C. Jason Throop (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
92. Reckwitz, Das hybride Subjekt, 131-155;
93. see also approaches to subjectivity from anthropology: Webb Keane, Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 9-25;
94. From intellectual history: Taylor, Sources of the Self; and from the history of science: Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (London: Free Associations Books, 1999).
95. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Psychological Review 3, no. 4 (1896), 357-370, esp. 357-358.
96. On emotion, see idem, "The Theory of Emotion. (1) Emotional Attitudes," Psychological Review 1, no. 6 (1894), 553-569
97. And idem, "The Theory of Emotion. (2) The Significance of Emotions," Psychological Review 2, no. 1 (1895), 13-32.
98. Dewey, "Reflex Arc," 365.
99. Here the passions, as Thomas Dixon phrased it, are viewed as "mini-agents" outside the subject; see his From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 106.
100. This is the argument presented in Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2002), 35: "The autonomy of affect...is its openness," and the moment it is "[f]ormed, qualified, situated," it is "captured" (emphasis in the original).
101. Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, 39.
102. Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 208-224.
103. For a detailed study of how the shift from the philosophical and theological concepts of "passions," "affections," and "sentiments" to the psychological concept of bodily "emotions" removed them from the moral sphere in the course of the nineteenth century, see Dixon, From Passions to Emotions.
104. For more on Bourdieu's political engagements, see Swartz, Culture and Power, 266-269.
105. On practices of negotiating the inner and outer in early modern Europe, see John J. Martin, Myths of Renaissance Individualism (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004);
106. see also Reddy, Navigation of Feeling, 154-172 on sincerity and sentimentalism
107. And Solomon's neo-Stoic formulation in True to Our Feelings, 121-122.
108. On the intersection of media studies and the history of emotions, see Die Massen bewegen: Medien und Emotionen in der Moderne, ed. Frank Bösch and Manuel Borutta (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2006).
109. Talal Asad, "Thinking about Agency and Pain," in idem, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 67-99.
110. James H. Johnson, Listening in Paris: A Cultural History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 246-248.
111. See also Daniel L. Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 112-189.
112. Angus Bancroft, Drugs, Intoxication and Society (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009).
113. See Tanya Luhrmann, "What Counts as Data?" in Emotions in the Field: The Psychology and Anthropology of Fieldwork Experience, ed. James Davies and Dimitrina Spencer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 212-238. Luhrmann attributes a significant role to proclivity (228), and seems to suggest that these are inborn talents for certain religious practices. It would, however, be difficult to determine in a given experiment whether people's proclivity stems from their genes or their habitus.
114. See William M. Reddy, "Sentimentalism and Its Erasure: The Role of Emotions in the Era of the French Revolution," Journal of Modern History 72 (2000), 109-152, esp. 131 for the "common response" of confirmation of emotives and the "escalation of intensity" that ensues.
115. Plamper, "The History of Emotions," 242, refers to this embodied character as the prosody of speech and links it to social context, hinting at the work of the habitus in producing emotives.
116. See also Paul E. Griffiths, "Is Emotion a Natural Kind?" in Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, ed. Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 233-249.
117. Lutz and Abu-Lughod, "Emotion, Discourse, and the Politics of Everyday Life," 10.
118. This term as it is used in management seminars for businessmen and -women is from Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than IQ (New York: Bantam, 1995).
119. See Eva Illouz, Oprah Winfrey and the Glamour of Misery: An Essay on Popular Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
120. Ethan Watters, Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche (New York: Free Press, 2010).
121. Rachel Dwyer, "Kiss and Tell: Expressing Love in Hindi Movies," in Love in South Asia: A Cultural History, ed. Francesca Orsini (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 289-302.
122. Emotions as a means of exchange in religious practice is explicated in John Corrigan, Business of the Heart: Religion and Emotion in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
123. Webb Keane, "Sincerity, 'Modernity,' and the Protestants," Cultural Anthropology 17 (2002), 65-92.
124. Arjun Appadurai, "Topographies of the Self: Praise and Emotion in Hindu India," in Lutz and Abu-Lughod, eds., Language and the Politics of Emotion, 92-112.
125. On entangled conceptions of sincerity in the colonial period, see Margrit Pernau, "Teaching Emotions: Encounter between Victorian Values and Indo-Persian Concepts of Civility in Nineteenth-Century Delhi," in Knowledge Production, Pedagogy, and Insitutions in Colonial India, ed. Indra Sengupta and Daud Ali, Palgrave Studies in Cultural and Intellectual History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 227-247, esp. 229-232.
126. Reddy, "Sentimentalism and Its Erasure," 118: "sincerity must be considered a specialized skill."
127. Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 2.
128. Lutz, Unnatural Emotions, 83-86.
129. See the current debate in medieval history between Gerd Althoff and Peter Dinzelbacher over "panritualism" and the interpretation of emotions, discussed in Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Thinking Historically about Medieval Emotions," History Compass 8 (2010), 828-842.
130. Martin, Myths of Renaissance Individualism, 110: the "desire to connect speech with feeling" is a "characteristically modern" concern.
131. Hochschild, The Managed Heart;
132. Paul Ekman, Wallace V. Friesen, and Phoebe Ellsworth, Emotion in the Human Face: Guidelines for Research and an Integration of Findings (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon, 1972);
133. Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, "Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards," American Historical Review 90 (1985), 813-836.
134. Barbara H. Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
135. Cf. Lila Abu-Lughod, "Writing against Culture," in Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present, ed. Richard Fox (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1991), 137-162.
136. See Reddy, "Emotional Styles." I thank Benno Gammerl for many fruitful discussions to clarify this term.
137. Benno Gammerl, "Emotional Styles: Concepts and Challenges in Researching Emotions," Rethinking History (forthcoming 2012).
138. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, transl. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 40.
139. Bourdieu refers to the inertia of the body/habitus as "hysteresis" (Logic of Practice, 59).
140. See Ute Frevert, Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995)
141. And idem, Emotions in History: Lost and Found. The Natalie Zemon Davis Annual Lectures (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011).