The framework(s) of legal change

Cornell Law Review

Volumn 97, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 595-625

  Heytens, Toby J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

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EID: 84860326506     PISSN: 00108847     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (166)

1. Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L. J. 922, 922 (2006).
2. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distributes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 247-55 (2011) (discussing potential new procedures for appellate courts deciding how to proceed with a case where a change in the law is underway or may soon occur);
3. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1733-38 (1991) (analyzing the constitutional implications of "new" law or legal changes);
4. Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1056-58 (1997) (using equilibrium theory to provide a comprehensive analysis of general legal change);
5. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 511 (1986) (discussing the effects of legal transitions on the markets);
6. Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 455-61 (2001) (discussing the impact of legal changes on criminal defendants in the context of "fair warning" requirements). (Pubitemid 33632033)
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444 (1966).
8. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000). Apprendi held that, as a matter of constitutional law, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
9. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U. S. 213, 218 (1969).
10. See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1355-62 (2010).
11. 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
12. 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
13. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 619 (1965).
14. See, e.g., James B. Haddad, "Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 417, 417-20 (1969);
15. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 56-58 (1965);
16. Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 719-20 (1966).
17. 489 U. S. 288, 305-10 (1989) (plurality opinion).
18. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011).
19. 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723-24 (2009).
20. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24.
21. For an overview of the good-faith exception and citations to some of the voluminous scholarly literature, see 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.06, at 372-82 (5th ed. 2010).
22. (discussing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974)).
23. accord Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1131-33 (1999);
24. Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What the Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What It Might, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1677, 1689-90 (2007) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Retrospective].
25. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
26. 453 U. S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
27. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
28. Davis v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011) (emphasis added).
29. Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
30. (citing United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1999)).
31. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
32. (asserting that it did not overrule Belton), with Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L. J. 1, 37 (2010) (asserting that Gant "effectively overruled" Belton)
33. and David L. Berland, Note, Stopping the Pendulum: Why Stare Decisis Should Constrain the Court from Further Modification of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 717-19 (arguing why Gant overruled Belton and why "Belton should not have been overruled").
34. See, e.g., Michael Goodin, Arizona v. Gant: The Supreme Court Gets It Right (Almost), 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 115, 145 (2010) (arguing that drivers' Fourth Amendment rights are better protected under Gant than under the broad reading of Belton);
35. Stanley T. Mortensen, Note, Gant: Restoring Balance to the Fourth Amendment's Search-Incident-to-a-Valid-Arrest Exception, 9 APPALACHIAN J. L. 259, 278-79 (2010) (arguing that Gant "restores balance" to the Fourth Amendment with regard to the search-incident-to-a-valid-arrest exception).
36. See, e.g., Jana L. Knott, Note, Is There An App for That? Reexamining the Doctrine of Search Incident to Lawful Arrest in the Context of Cell Phones, 35 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 445, 461-62 (2010) (using Gant to propose two new approaches to the doctrine of search-incident-to-lawful-arrest in the context of cell phones);
37. Chelsea Oxton, Note, The Search Incident to Arrest Exception Plays Catch Up: Why the Police May No Longer Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Without a Warrant, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1159 (2010) ("[L]ower court decisions that allowed searches of cell phones incident to arrest are further incorrect in light of Arizona v. Gant.");
38. Angad Singh, Comment, Stepping Out of the Vehicle: The Potential of Arizona v. Gant to End Automatic Searches Incident to Arrest Beyond the Vehicular Context, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1759, 1797 (2010) (arguing that Gant "extends to other contexts, such as searches of containers on the person and homes incident to arrest").
39. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does It Matter?, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 317 (suggesting that Gant "may have a significant effect on Fourth Amendment law-and on police practices on the ground-or it may not make much difference at all");
40. Scott R. Grubman, Bark With No Bite: How the Inevitable Discovery Rule is Undermining the Supreme Court's Decision in Arizona v. Gant, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 169 (2011) (concluding that the Gant "decision's effect is more theoretical and scholarly than practical").
41. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 3-5 (2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf.
42. Belton Citing References Search, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com
43. (enter "Sign On" information; click "Westlaw" tab; then search" 453 U. S. o454 in the "Find by citation" box; then click "Citing References").
44. 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
45. 530 U. S. 466 (2000).
46. Accord Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L. J. 1077, 1079 (2011) (observing that Davis "determines how thousands of Fourth Amendment cases will be litigated as well as whether some defendants are set free or remain in prison").
47. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65, 77-78 (describing the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution).
48. 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
49. 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
50. Mapp, 367 U. S. at 660.
51. 381 U. S. 618 (1965).
52. (quoting Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 374 (1940)).
53. see, e.g., Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1557-58 (1975) (describing Linkletter's limited acceptance), both its distinction between direct and collateral review and its conclusion that Mapp should not operate retroactively with respect to a case that was on collateral review when Mapp was handed down are perfectly consistent with current law
54. see, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 295-96 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing Linkletter to deny retroactivity to petitioner).
55. Linkletter, 381 U. S. at 637.
56. 384 U. S. 436 (1966);
57. see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 733 (1966)
58. (considering the retroactive effect of Miranda and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964));
59. see also Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U. S. 213, 213-14 (1969) (considering whether Miranda applies to "post-Miranda retrials of cases originally tried prior to that decision" (footnote omitted)).
60. 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
61. see also Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 254 (1969) ("In sum, we hold that Katz is to be applied only to cases in which the prosecution seeks to introduce the fruits of electronic surveillance conducted after [the Katz decision].").
62. 388 U. S. 218 (1967).
63. 388 U. S. 263 (1967).
64. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 300 (1967) ("We conclude, therefore, that the Wade and Gilbert rules should not be made retroactive."). By one count, the Supreme Court decided more than twenty-five cases involving the retroactivity of criminal-procedure decisions between 1965 and 1982.
65. (citing 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.9, at 121 (1984)).
66. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 619-20, 622 & n. 5 (1965) ("[I]n this case, we are concerned only with whether the exclusionary principle enunciated in Mapp applies to state court convictions which had become final before rendition of our opinion." (footnote omitted)).
67. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 733 (1966);
68. Stovall, 388 U. S. at 297.
69. 530 U. S. 466 (2000).
70. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1547-55 apps. B-C (2001).
71. 535 U. S. 625 (2002).
72. 479 U. S. 314 (1987).
73. Cotton, 535 U. S. at 628.
74. Cotton, 535 U. S. at 629-31.
75. 543 U. S. 220 (2005).
76. Booker, 543 U. S. at 268.
77. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
78. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011).
79. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Debruhl, 993 A.2d 571 (D. C. Cir. 2010);
81. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009);
82. United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009)
83. reh'g denied, 598 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2010);
84. State v. Daniel, 242 P.3d 1186 (Kan. 2010);
85. People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041 (Colo. 2010) (en banc);
86. see also State v. Harris, 58 So. 3d 408, 409-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing other cases).
87. United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 631 (2001).
88. (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444 (1944))).
89. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
90. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976).
91. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 10 (1995)
92. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906 (1984));
93. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 354 (1974).
94. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
95. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L. J. 87, 90-91 (1999) [hereinafter Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap] (arguing that "limiting money damages for constitutional violations⋯ facilitates constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation");
96. see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L. J. 259, 271-75 (2000) ("Without a limit on costs, there would be less reform.").
97. See Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 104, at 98 ("In all likelihood, the Supreme Court would never have required Miranda warnings if doing so meant that every confessed criminal then in custody had to be set free.");
98. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889-90 (1999) (same);
99. see also LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 178 (1994) (making similar observation about the Warren Court's concerns about retroactivity);
100. see United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1963)
101. (noting that Linkletter "had timely objected to the introduction of this evidence"), aff'd, 381 U. S. 618 (1965), and the perceived unavailability of a remedy-limiting one
102. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d) (1) (2006) (listing standards for granting federal habeas corpus relief to state prisoners).
103. See United States v. Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 1018 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Under the drug abuse prevention statutes at issue here
104. 21 U. S. C. §§ 841, 952 and 960, the quantity of a drug is not a substantive element of any of the crimes involved.").
105. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U. S. 461, 467-68 (1997) (considering the issue for purposes of the "plainness" prong of the "plain-error" test). And, more generally, unless one is willing to conclude that even a defendant whose failure to object is explained by the presence of a seemingly secure, on-all-fours precedent of the Supreme Court itself should still be subject to a less favorable standard of appellate review-and I am not-courts will face line-drawing problems in any event.
106. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 629-32 (2002) (listing preconditions for relief under the plain-error standard).
107. See United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 734-35 (1993). In a 1994 decision, a Second Circuit panel suggested that "[w]hen a supervening decision alters settled law,⋯ the burden of persuasion as to prejudice [under the plain-error standard] is borne by the government, and not the defendant."
108. United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1994). This holding, however, has been criticized by numerous other circuits and has not been adopted by any of them
109. see, e.g., United States v. Pelisamen, 641 F.3d 399, 404-05 (9th Cir. 2011) ("This circuit has not adopted the Viola burden-shifting rule and contrary to Defendant's assertion, the framework has not been adopted in other circuits either." (citing cases)), and later Second Circuit panels have questioned whether it remains good law even in that circuit
110. see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 457 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2005).
111. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011
112. (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 13 (1995))).
113. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426-27
114. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976)
115. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 10 (1995)
116. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974)
117. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922 (1984);
118. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981, 981-82 (1984).
119. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 352-53 (1987).
120. See Herring v. United States, 555 U. S. 135, 145-47 (2009);
121. Evans, 514 U. S. at 10, 14-16.
122. See Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357, 364-69 (1998) (parolerevocation proceedings);
123. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (immigration proceedings);
124. Stone, 428 U. S. at 494 (federal habeas corpus proceedings);
125. United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 459-60 (1976) (federal civil tax proceedings where the evidence was seized by state officials);
126. Calandra, 414 U. S. at 347-52 (grand jury proceedings).
127. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586, 590-99 (2006) (violations of constitutional "knock-and-announce" rule).
128. See, e.g., Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 104, at 91-94.
129. See, e.g., J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011) (describing Miranda as having "adopted a set of prophylactic measures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarantee against self- incrimination"). This approach is not without controversy. Compare
130. e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100 (1985)
131. with David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988).
132. See, e.g., Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 348-50 (1990)
133. (holding that violation of the prophylactic rule associated with Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986), did not bar use of resulting evidence to impeach defendant's trial testimony);
134. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 307-08 (1985) (holding that prior Miranda violation does not "taint" subsequent voluntary statements obtained in compliance with Miranda);
135. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 135-46;
136. Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (holding that statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial).
137. It appears that all of these decisions remain good law despite their obvious tension with the Supreme Court's subsequent holding in Dickerson v. United States that Miranda was a "constitutional decision." 530 U. S. 428, 432 (2000);
138. 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
139. See Tucker, 417 U. S. at 462. The interrogating officer had done pretty well, all things considered. The officer asked the defendant whether he knew the crime for which he was being held, whether he knew his constitutional rights, and whether he wanted an attorney; the officer also had advised the defendant that any statements he made could be used against him in court. What the officer had not done, however, was inform the defendant that he would be provided with an attorney free of charge if he could not afford one.
140. See Miranda, 384 U. S. at 436.
141. Tucker, 417 U. S. at 450.
142. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2430-31 (2011).
143. See Tucker, 417 U. S. at 439-46 (devoting nine pages to that issue).
144. 541 U. S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
145. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 490 (2000) (stating that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt").
146. See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U. S. at 63 (describing the "unpardonable vice" of the previous Confrontation Clause regime as being "its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude").
147. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965);
148. 489 U. S. 288, 292 (1989) (plurality opinion).
149. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 409 (2007) (addressing the retroactivity of Crawford);
150. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 358 (2004)
151. (addressing the retroactivity of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002)).
152. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final").
153. Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 300-10 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[N]ew constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.").
154. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (forfeiture);
155. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (remedy-limiting).
156. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 683 (1993).
157. I am unaware of any decision since Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 130 (1982) - which was decided seven years before Teague-in which the Court relied on a forfeiture strategy in the changed-law setting.
158. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423-24 (2011).
159. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
160. Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 104, at 97.
161. (citing Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 256-82 (1998)).
162. See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U. S. 605, 610 (2005) ("The Federal Constitution imposes on the States no obligation to provide appellate review of criminal convictions.").
163. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 634 (2002).
164. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 4 (b) (1) (A) ("In a criminal case, a defendant's notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days after the later of: (i) the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed; or (ii) the filing of the government's notice of appeal.").
165. see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 320-28 (1987), nor identified any particular statutory authorization when it embraced a nonretroactivity approach in the habeas context
166. see Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 298-99 (1989) (plurality opinion). And even if one believed that courts may or should not resume applying a nonretroactivity approach in the direct-review context absent a more express statutory authorization, I would simply argue that Congress should amend the appropriate statutes.