Bark with no bite: How the inevitable discovery rule is undermining the supreme court's decision in Arizona v. Gant

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

Volumn 101, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 119-170

  Grubman, Scott R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952464909     PISSN: 00914169     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (345)

1. K.N. Llewellyn, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 189 (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1981) (1930) (emphasis omitted).
2. See, e.g., Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Llewellyn's principle in insurance context)
3. Anderson v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., 933 F.2d 1500, 1504 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying principle in context of motion for directed verdict)
4. G. & T. Terminal Packaging Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 830 F.2d 1230, 1238 (3d Cir. 1987) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (applying principle in context of federal preemption).
5. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
6. Id. at 763-64.
7. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).
8. See infra Part II.B.3.
9. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
11. Id. at 1719.
12. Apr. See, e.g., Ken Wallentine, PoliceOne Analysis: Arizona v. Gant, POLICEONE.COM 22, 2009), http://www.policeone.com/legal/articles/1813475-PoliceOne-Analysis-Arizo na-v- Gant/ (discussing concerns over the Gant decision).
13. In a New York Times article written the same day Gant was decided, William J. Johnson, the executive director of the National Association of Police Organizations, had this to say about the Court's decision: "It's just terrible. It's certainly going to result in less drug and weapons cases being made."
14. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Cuts Back Officers' Searches of Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009, at A12.
15. See infra note 220.
16. For a further discussion of the potential for abuse of the search incident to arrest exception, see Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 396 (2001);
17. Michael Schoen, Garcia v. State: A Recent Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Decision Resolves the Texas Pretext Debate in Favor of an Objective Approach, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 784 (1993).
18. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
19. Id. at 392.
20. Michael Goodin, Arizona v. Gant: The Supreme Court Gets It Right (Almost)
21. 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 115, 119-20 (2010) (discussing history of search incident to arrest exception, including Weeks)
22. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969).
23. Id.; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
24. 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
25. Id. at 134.
26. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
27. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969).
28. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
29. See Goodin, supra note 17, at 120.
30. Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
31. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
32. Id. at 193.
33. Id. at 193-94.
34. Id. at 194.
35. Id. at 194-95.
36. Id. at 199 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925);
37. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1924)
38. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
39. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
40. Id. at 349.
41. Id. at 349-50.
42. Id. at 350.
43. Id. at 356.
44. Id. at 358.
45. Id. at 358.
46. 285 U.S. 452, 458 (1932).
47. Id. at 458-59.
48. Id. at 459-60.
49. Id. at 460.
50. Id. at 460-61.
51. Id. at 461.
52. Id. at 462.
53. Id. at 462-63.
54. Id. at 463-64.
55. Id. at 464.
56. Id. at 465.
57. Id. at 467.
58. Id. at 465.
59. Id. at 465-66 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 395 (1914)).
60. Id. at 467.
61. Kenneth M. Murchison, Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment: A New Look at Some Old Cases, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 501-02 (1982) (discussing how Go- Bart and Lefkowitz represented a break from Court's Prohibition Era search incident to arrest decisions).
62. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
63. See James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to
64. Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1424 (2007) (discussing history of search incident to arrest exception and noting that Harris was an abrupt break from Court's previous decisions).
65. Harris, 331 U.S. at 148.
66. Id. at 148.
67. Id. at 148-49.
68. Id. at 149.
69. Id. at 146.
70. Id. at 150.
71. Id. at 155.
72. Id. at 152.
73. Id. at 153.
74. See Tomkovicz, supra note71, at 1424 (discussing inconsistencies amongst search incident to arrest decisions during this time period).
75. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
76. Id. at 709-10.
77. Justice Douglas, who joined the majority in Harris, provided the fifth (swing) vote in Trupiano.
78. See J. Woodford Howard Jr., On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 43, 53 (1968).
79. Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 701.
80. Id. at 702.
81. Id. at 699.
82. Id. at 703.
83. Id. at 703-04.
84. Id. at 704.
85. Id. at 705.
86. Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931)).
87. Id. at 706.
88. Id. at 708.
89. Id. at 708-09.
90. Id. at 709.
91. See Tomkovicz, supra note 71, at 1425.
92. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). In the two years between Trupiano and Rabinowitz, two of the Justices that joined the Trupiano majority-Justices Frank Murphy and Wiley Blount Rutledge-died.
93. See Justice Murphy Dies at 59 in Detroit of Heart Attack, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1949, at 1
94. Justice Wiley Rutledge Dies of Brain Hemorrhage at 55, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1949, at 1. They were replaced by Justices Tom Clark and Sherman Minton, respectively.
95. See Mark Strasser, Religion in the Schools: On Prayer, Neutrality, and Sectarian Perspectives, 42 AKRON L. REV. 185, 201 (2009).
96. Both Justices Clark and Minton joined the majority in Rabinowitz. Justice Douglas, another member of the Trupiano majority, did not participate in Rabinowitz. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 66.
97. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 57-58.
98. Id. at 58.
99. Id. at 59.
100. Id. at 66.
101. Id. at 60 (internal citation omitted).
102. Id. at 60-61.
103. Id. at 61.
104. Id. at 62.
105. Id. at 62-63.
106. Id. at 63.
107. Id. at 63-64.
108. Id. at 64.
109. Id. at 65.
110. Id. at 66.
111. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1969).
112. For a thorough discussion of the Court's decision in Chimel,
113. see Tomkovicz, supra note 71, at 1427-30.
114. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753.
115. Id. at 754.
116. Id. at 754.
117. Id. at 754-55.
118. Id. at 755.
119. Id. at 755-760.
120. Id. at 768.
121. Id. at 760.
122. Id. at 762 (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)).
123. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For an explanation of the holding in Terry v. Ohio
124. see infra note 182.
125. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
126. Id. at 763.
127. Id. at 763 (quoting Katz v. United States, 347 U.S. 351, 357 (1967)).
128. Id. at 767.
129. Id. at 768.
130. Id. at 763.
131. 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
132. Id. at 234 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 20 (1925)).
133. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may "stop and frisk" a suspect whom the officer has reason to believe is "armed and presently dangerous." 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). The Court in Terry held that "the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure" and that "the scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."
134. Id. at 19-20 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
135. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
136. Id. at 234-35.
137. Id. at 235.
138. 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980). It is important to note that, in Rawlings, although the search at issue preceded any actual arrest, the officers did have probable cause to arrest the defendant before conducting the search.
139. Id. at 100-01.
140. 415 U.S. 800, 801, 810 (1974).
141. Id. at 807.
142. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of a Public Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 389-97 (1986) (discussing the expansion of the automobile exception post-Chimel).
143. 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981).
144. Id. at 462-63.
145. Id. at 455.
146. Id. at 455-56.
147. Id. at 456.
148. People v. Belton, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421 (N.Y. 1980).
149. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981).
150. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
151. Id. at 458.
152. Id. (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
153. Id. at 459 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
154. Id. at 459-60.
155. Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)) (citation omitted). In a footnote, the Court in Belton clarified its holding: "Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."
156. Id. at 460 n.3.
157. Id. at 460-61.
158. Id. at 460 n.4.
159. Id. As discussed more below, this limitation has little practical effect. This is because police may search a vehicle's trunk as part of an inventory search subsequent to arrest.
160. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 370 (1987). The availability of inventory searches, combined with the inevitable discovery rule,
161. see, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984), means that courts will often uphold the search of a locked trunk despite the limitation discussed in Belton.
162. See infra note 378 (discussing Nix v. Williams).
163. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461.
164. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
165. Id. at 462.
166. In his dissent, Justice Brennan cited the state court's recitation of the facts, which clearly indicate that the search in question came after the defendant was placed under arrest outside of the searched vehicle.
167. Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 462 (majority opinion).
169. Id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 464-65.
171. Id. at 465 (quoting Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969)).
172. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
173. Belton, 453 U.S. at 465-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 466.
175. Id. at 468-69.
176. Id. at 472 (White, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 460.
178. Id. at 460-61 & n.4.
179. Id. at 461.
180. 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998). The Court in Knowles noted that the officer had the right, under Iowa law, to arrest the driver. Id.
181. Id. at 114-15.
182. Id. at 115.
183. Id. at 115-16.
184. Id. at 116-17.
185. Id. at 117 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412 (1997)).
186. Id. at 117-18.
187. Id. at 118.
188. Id. at 117.
189. Id. at 118.
190. 541 U.S. 615 (2004)
191. see Tomkovicz
192. supra note 71, at 1437 (discussing continuing expansion of exception between Belton and Thornton).
193. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617.
194. Id. at 617-18.
195. Id. at 618-19.
196. Id. at 619.
197. Id. (quoting United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 195-96 (4th Cir. 2003)).
198. Id. at 620.
199. Id. at 620-21.
200. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 622-23.
202. Id. at 623-24.
203. Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurrence, criticizing the willingness of lower courts to expand Belton where the twin rationales justifying searches incident to arrest were not present.
204. Id. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 629.
207. Id. at 629-30.
208. Id. at 632.
209. Id. at 634 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 635.
211. Id. at 636.
212. Id. (internal citation omitted).
213. Id. at 620-21.
214. Id. at 622-23.
215. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 n.2 (2009) (collecting circuit cases).
216. 453 F.3d 1099, 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 2006).
217. 433 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006).
218. Id. at 1106 (citations omitted).
219. Id. at 1107.
220. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 221 F. App'x 715, 717 (10th Cir. 2007)
221. United States v. Williams, 170 F. App'x 399, 401 (6th Cir. 2006)
222. United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005)
223. United States v. Osife, 398 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 2005)
224. United States v. Sumrall, 115 F. App'x 22, 24 (10th Cir. 2004).
225. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
226. Id. at 1715.
227. Id. (citing State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 644 (Ariz. 2007)).
228. Gant, 162 P.3d at 642-43.
229. Id. at 643.
230. Id. at 644.
231. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.
232. Id. at 1716-18.
233. Id. at 1718 (citation omitted).
234. Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
235. Id. at 1719 (internal citations omitted).
236. Id. at 1719 n.4.
237. Id. at 1719 (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
238. Id. (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998)).
239. Id. at 1720.
240. Id. at 1721.
241. Id. at 1722.
242. Id. at 1723.
243. Id. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring).
244. Id. (emphasis in original).
245. Id. at 1724-25.
246. Id. at 1725.
247. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 1725-26.
249. Id. at 1726.
250. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 1727. Justice Alito also criticized the majority for abandoning Belton's bright- line rule, and stated that the majority could not justify its departure from the normal rule of stare decisis. Id. He also criticized the majority for "leav[ing] the law relating to searches incident to arrest in a confused and unstable state."
252. Id. at 1731.
253. Id. at 1723.
254. Id. at 1719 & n.4.
255. Id. at 1719.
256. It remains open whether an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs would fall into the same category as other traffic violations that do not permit searches incident to arrest. There is an argument that the second holding in Gant would include these types of arrests because, unlike arrests for driving on a suspended license, it might be reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains evidence related to the offense of arrest such as open containers of alcohol, drugs, or drug paraphernalia.
257. See Eric H. Sills & Erin H. Gerstenzang, Column: DWI, CHAMPION MAG., December 2009, at *56. On the other hand, because possession is not an element of driving under the influence, it could be argued that such evidence, even if found, would not be "evidence of the offense of arrest." The author could not find any cases discussing Gant's effect on DUI arrests. As this is not the focus of this Article, it is enough to raise the issue without further analysis.
258. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720.
259. 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1976).
260. United States v. Battle, No. 09-4169, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5427, at *7 (4th Cir. Mar. 16, 2010).
261. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).
262. Battle, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5427, at *7.
263. For a more detailed history of the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement, see Steven M. Christenson, Colorado v. Bertine Opens the Inventory Search to Containers, 73 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1998).
264. People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d 411, 418 (Colo. 1985), rev'd, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
265. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)).
266. Id. at 374 n.6.
267. Id. at 375.
268. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)
269. see Christenson
270. supra note 369, at 783.
271. United States v. Wright, No. 4:08-cr-18, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19676, at *16 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2010) (citing United States v. Jemison, 310 F. App'x 866, 871 (6th Cir. 2009))
272. see also United States v. Long, 705 F.2d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1983)
273. United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1982)
274. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 893 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 968 (1978).
275. In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) [hereinafter Williams II], the Court established the inevitable discovery rule, holding that "[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means," then the evidence should not be excluded. The Court in Williams II rejected a rule that would have required the prosecution to prove the absence of bad faith by the police.
276. Id. at 445.
277. Id. at 444. The reason this did not work to save the evidence in Gant itself is because, in Gant, the officers "had no intention of impounding Gant's car until after they searched the passenger compartment and found the contraband."
278. State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 646 (Ariz. 2007).
279. See infra notes 384-389 and accompanying text.
280. 329 F. App'x 794 (10th Cir. 2009).
281. Id. at 798 n.1.
282. Id. at 798.
283. see also United States v. Allen, No. 4:08-cr-40, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95383, at *4-6 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2009) (upholding search of vehicle as lawful inventory search unaffected by Gant)
284. United States v. McCullum, No. 3:07-cr-128, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93377, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2009) (same)
285. United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:08-cr-0094, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56826, at *23 n.6 (W.D. Pa. July 2, 2009) (same)
286. United States v. Elliot, No. 09cr0082, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40222, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2009) (declining to reach the Gant issue because search was lawful inventory search).
287. 586 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2009).
288. Id. at 715.
289. Id. at 719.
290. In a subsequent case, United States v. Avendano, No. 08-50505, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6836, at *4-5 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010), the Ninth Circuit cited this language from Ruckes and held that, in the case before it, the Government could not rely on the inevitable discovery rule to save a search made unlawful by Gant where the Government "failed to meet its burden of proving standardized local procedure and compliance with that procedure."
291. Id. at *4
292. see also United States v. Chavez, No. 2:09-cr-0033, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116924, at *19-21 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009) (same).
293. United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that, even if search was unlawful under Gant, evidence was admissible because it would have inevitably been discovered during later inventory search)
294. Davis v. Smith, No. 3:09CV274, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5163, at *13-14 (E.D. Va. Jan. 22, 2010) (applying same reasoning in civil case for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment)
295. United States v. Bradford, No. 09-CR-71, 2009
296. U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110385, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 5, 2009) ("[E]ven if the search of the car exceeded the bounds set by Gant, the government demonstrated that the gun would inevitably have been discovered pursuant to the inventory search.")
297. United States v. Morillo, No. 08 CR 676, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94396, at *6-7, 23 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009) (despite violation of Gant, evidence was admissible because it would have inevitably been discovered during inventory search)
298. United States v. Maxwell, No. 4:09CR299, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77454, at *7-8 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 2009) (holding that search was permissible under Gant and, alternatively, that evidence would have inevitably been discovered during inventory search)
299. United States v. Owen, No. 1:09cr38HSO, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85929, at *11-12 (S.D. Miss. August 28, 2009) (same)
300. Humphreys v. State, No. S09P1428, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 227, at *32-33 (Ga. Mar. 15, 2010) ("We need not determine whether the search of the [vehicle] after [the defendant]'s arrest was valid under Gant, however, because it is apparent that the evidence seized from the vehicle would have been discovered during the subsequent inventory of the vehicle and that it was therefore admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.")
301. People v. Reyes, No. B214107, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9935, at15 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009) (Mosk, J., concurring) (discussing possible application of inevitable discovery rule in Gant context).
302. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009) ("Although we have recognized that a motorist's privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home. the former interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protections.").
303. See supra notes 365-377 and accompanying text.
304. For a detailed argument of why the inevitable discovery rule should be applied only to secondary, and not primary, evidence see Jessica Forbes, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence, and the Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221 (1987).
305. 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987).
306. Id. at 912.
307. Id. at 912-13.
308. Id. at 913.
309. Id. at 912.
310. Id. at 913-14.
311. Id. at 914.
312. Id. (quoting Williams II, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)).
313. 889 N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
314. Id. at 920.
315. Id. at 920-21.
316. State v. Crossen, 536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) ("The inevitable discovery rule has been applied only to purge the taint from derivative, not primary, evidence and we see no reason in this case to extend it to the latter.")
317. Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d
318. See, e.g., People v. Burola, 848 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1993) ("[T]he inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies to both primary and secondary evidence")
319. Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 546 N.E.2d 336, 339 (Mass. 1989) (same)
320. State v. Sincell, No. 19073, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1656, at7-8 (2002) (same); State v. Flippo, 575 S.E.2d 170, 188 n.22 (W. Va. 2002) (same).
321. In Williams II, the defendant argued that because his confession to murder violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and was therefore inadmissible, the derivative evidence obtained as a result of the information learned during that confession-the location and condition of the victim's body-should also be excluded from evidence. 467 U.S. 431, 437 (1984). The Court in Williams II rejected this, and held that the derivative evidence-i.e., the body-was admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.
322. Id. at 447-50.
323. Id. at 444.
324. Id. at 446.
325. People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. 1987).
326. 536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
327. See Stephen H. LaCount & Anthony J. Girese, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule, an Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 483, 508 (1975).
328. For a more detailed discussion on the burden of proof required for inevitable discovery, and an argument in support of raising that burden, see Steven P. Grossman, The Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A Plea for Reasonable Limitations, 92 DICK. L. REV. 313, 351-52 (1987).
329. Williams II, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
330. Id. at 444 n.5 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974)).
331. 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
332. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5.
333. Grossman, supra note 422, at 353.
334. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
335. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 479-80 (Alaska 1997) (following Justice Brennan's view in Williams II dissent and holding that prosecution must prove inevitable discovery by clear and convincing evidence)
336. State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 907 (Haw. 1995) (same)
337. State v. Sugar, 495 A.2d 90, 103-04 (N.J. 1985) (applying clear and convincing evidence standard)
338. see also Proferes v. State, 13 P.3d 955, 958 (Nev. 2000) (seemingly applying clear and convincing evidence standard, although also discussing preponderance standard)
339. State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502,512(N.C.1992)(Frye, J., concurring) (criticizing majority's rule that inevitable discovery must be proved by preponderance of evidence, and advocating for clear and convincing standard).
340. 467 U.S. at 445.
341. For a detailed argument of why the Court should reconsider its holding in Williams II and impose a good faith requirement, see Hon. John E. Fennelly, Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception: The Need For a Good Faith Requirement, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1085 (1991).
342. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 445.
343. See, e.g., Smith, 948 P.2d at 481
344. Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Mass. 1997).
345. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.4(a), at 244 (3d ed. 1996).