Voting with limited information and many alternatives

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1036-1055

  Chierichetti, Flavio ^a   Kleinberg, Jon ^a  

^a School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AXIOMATIC APPROACH; BOARD OF DIRECTORS; GROUP DECISION; HIGH PROBABILITY; LIMITED INFORMATION; PLURALITY VOTING; PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION; SET OF QUESTIONS;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 84860173530     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973099.82     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (17)

1. Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt. Information cascades in the laboratory. American Economic Review, 87(5):847-862, December 1997.
2. David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks. Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review, 90(1):34-45, March, 1996.
3. Marco Battaglini, Rebecca B. Morton, and Thomas R. Palfrey. The swing voter's curse in the laboratory. Review of Economic Studies, 77:61-89, 2010.
4. Sourav Bhattacharya. Preference reversal and information aggregation in elections, November 2007. Working paper, U. Pitt Dept. of Economics.
5. Ioannis Caragiannis and Ariel D. Procaccia. Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite limited communication. Artificial Intelligence, 175:1655-1671, 2011.
6. Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. The swing voter's curse. American Economic Review, 86(3):408-424, June 1996.
7. Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting. American Political Science Review, 92(1):23-35, March 1998.
8. Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. Abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences. American Political Science Review, 93(2):381-398, June 1999.
9. W. Feller. Generalization of a probability limit theorem of cramér. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 54:361-372, 1943.
10. Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv. Deliberative voting. Journal of Economic Theory, 134(1):317-338, May 2007.
11. Tilmann Gneiting and Adrian E. Raftery. Strictly proper scoring rules, prediction, and estimation. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 102(477):359-378, March 2007.
12. Patrick Hummel. Jury theorems with multiple alternatives. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(1):65-103, 2010.
13. Patrick Hummel. Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting. Mathematical Social Sciences, to appear.
14. Jiří Matoušek and Jan Vondrák. The probabilistic method.
15. Elchanan Mossel, Allan Sly, and Omer Tamuz. From agreement to asymptotic learning. Technical Report arxiv:l 105.4765v3 [math.ST], arxiv.org, June 2011.
16. Roger B. Myerson. Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Games and Economic Behavior, 25(1):111-131, October 1998.
17. H. Peyton Young. Condorcet's theory of voting. American Political Science Review, 82(4):1231-1244, December 1988.