Rethinking the tragedy of the commons: The integration of socio-psychological dispositions

JASSS

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2012, Pages

  Schindler, Julia ^a  

^a NONE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Agent based model; Behavioral game theory; Common pool resources; Nash equilibria; Nash extension netlogo; Socio psychological dispositions; Tragedy of the commons

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859610361     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.18564/jasss.1822     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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