A crisis in federal habeas law

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 110, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 887-908

  Primus, Eve Brensike ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84859538930     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (82)

1. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247, 253 (1988) ("[T]he rules governing access to habeas review have become hopelessly confusing and confused. ")
2. Larry Yackle, Federal Habeas Corpus in a Nutshell, Hum. Rts., Summer 2001, at 8 ("[F]ederal habeas corpus is bogged down in Byzantine procedural snarls that not only frustrate the enforcement of constitutional rights but also squander time and resources. ").
3. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963)
4. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970)
5. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essay, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2009).
6. See Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf [hereinafter King Report].
7. Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
8. Harry Pratter Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
9. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029 (2007).
10. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essay, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2009).
11. Pp. 66, 86; see also Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 49, 53 (2010), http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/ pdfs/Circuit/King31.pdf (emphasizing that federal habeas review of state court cases should be limited to state court failures to vindicate federal rights "because they are federal").
12. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 53 (2010).
13. In so doing, I build on an idea that I previously discussed in Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
14. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 43 (2010).
15. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 55 (2010).
16. Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (2007).
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
18. Pp. 66, 86; Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 53 (2010). http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/ pdfs/Circuit/King31.pdf
19. Pp. 66, 86; Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 53 (2010). http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/ pdfs/Circuit/King31.pdf
20. The interpretation of adequacy could be very narrow or quite broad. Compare my proposed definition of adequacy, Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 53 (2010) Section II. B, with Senator Kyl's proposal in the Crime Prevention Act of 1995 to limit habeas review only to claims that "the remedies in the courts of the State are inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the person's detention, " S. 1495, 104th Congress, § 2257 (1995).
21. P. 93 (footnote omitted).
22. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 734-36 (Pa. 2002) (noting that the federal courts and the overwhelming majority of state courts refuse to hear ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal)
23. see also Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 679, 692 (2007) (collecting jurisdictions).
24. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 693 (2007).
25. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 694 (2007) (collecting statutes).
26. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989)
27. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
28. As other scholars point out: [M]any states do not provide for the appointment of counsel to assist an incarcerated prisoner in a noncapital collateral challenge, no matter how serious his allegations and no matter how incapable he is of presenting his own case pro se. In other states, limited or qualified rights to postconviction counsel do exist, but other factors, such as an absence of minimum qualification requirements for counsel or extremely low compensation rates, often result in the appointment of lawyers who neither know nor care about what they are doing and cannot afford to perform any better. John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 435, 445 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
29. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 689 (2007).
30. Inmates in jurisdictions that permit defendants to raise trial attorney ineffectiveness challenges on direct appeal often face different procedural challenges. In sharp contrast to the generous filing deadlines that many states are adopting to permit inmates to raise innocence claims based on new evidence (p. 98), states often have very restrictive time deadlines for filing direct appeals-deadlines that make it nearly impossible for a new attorney to get the trial transcript and reinvestigate the case in time to support an ineffectiveness challenge. See, e.g., Mich. Ct. R. §§ 7.211(C)(1)(a), 7.212(A)(1)(a). Unreasonable time limits are not the only problems in jurisdictions that currently permit defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 711-13 (2007). (describing the failure of some states to provide new counsel on appeal to raise these claims and the difficulty, in practice, of obtaining evidentiary hearings to support the claims).
31. See, e.g., Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 236 F. Supp. 2d 750, 755, 769-70 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (explaining how two attorneys in a first-degree murder trial failed to conduct any investigation, failed to file any motions, and failed to present any defense theory), rev'd on procedural grounds, Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 374 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2004)
32. see also Welsh S. White, Litigating in the Shadow of Death: Defense Attorneys in Capital Cases 3-8 (2006) (collecting instances of trial attorney ineffectiveness in capital cases).
33. See, e.g., ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, GIDEON'S Broken Promise: America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice, A Report on the American Bar Association's Hearings on the Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases 18 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_ criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (describing jurisdictions with attorney caseloads of over 1,000 cases per year)
34. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 686-87 (2007). (same).
35. See ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System 5 n.19 (2002), available at http:// www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf [hereinafter Ten Principles] (noting the figures of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force on Courts, which provide for a maximum caseload per year of 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals).
36. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 53 (2010), http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/ pdfs/Circuit/King31.pdf (noting that if states were failing to vindicate Sixth Amendment rights because they were federal, "then we might still be facing the kind of structural crisis involving government powers that habeas is designed to address, " but countering that "[w]e are convinced... that this is no longer true").
37. Compare p. 140 ("Most state judges never have the same day-to-day experience applying the rules that govern capital cases. "), with Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 579, 666-68 (1982)
38. (arguing that federal judges are more expert in federal law than their state counterparts), and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1515, 1517 (2007) ("Only Article III judges, who unlike their state counterparts are always politically independent and experts in federal law, can be trusted ultimately to expound that law accurately and guarantee its supremacy and uniformity. " (footnote omitted).
39. Compare p. 140 (emphasizing how state judges are "under pressure" when capital litigation "heats up"), with Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 666-68 (1982) (emphasizing that federal judges are politically independent)
40. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1517 (2007) (same).
41. Cf. Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991, 992-97 (1985) ("[S]tate criminal defendants are entitled to litigate their federal claims in a federal forum other than the Supreme Court. ").
42. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 13-14 (2010). (discussing the focus of the Reconstruction Congress).
43. The petitioner would, under those circumstances, not be held in violation of the laws of the United States, a violation of federal law having always been a prerequisite for federal habeas jurisdiction. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
44. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963), when it stated that the 1867 Act "seems plainly to have been designed to furnish a method additional to and independent of direct Supreme Court review of state court decisions for the vindication of the new constitutional guarantees. "
45. Cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 75-76 (Ox Bow Press reprt. 1985) (1969) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court's execution of its duty to bring states into line with federal law is what made its decisions controversial).
46. See p. 85 ("Habeas served as a stopgap in the absence of reasonable alternatives for judicial review and influenced the development of institutional and structural reforms to provide such alternative review. ")
47. William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 Utah L. Rev. 423, 441-42 (1961) (noting that "only a few States provide a post conviction proceeding adequate to permit the state courts to vindicate such violations of fundamental constitutional rights" and arguing that federal habeas jurisdiction should be used to "encourage [states] to vindicate" federal rights).
48. See, e.g., Noia, 372 U.S. at 441 (emphasizing that when "the States withhold effective remedy" for federal constitutional violations, "the federal courts have the power and the duty to provide it").
49. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 53 (2010).
50. In an article outlining their noncapital proposal, King and Hoffmann state that they "make no empirical claims about the effectiveness of present state appellate and postconviction review processes for addressing federal constitutional claims. " Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 836 (2010).(footnote omitted).
51. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989)
52. See John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 445-47 (2011) & n.64 (documenting these standards).
53. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
54. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 689-90 (1995)
55. see Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, Am. Bar Ass'n, http://www.abanet.org/leadership/fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
56. Consider, for example, the practice of New York state appellate courts of systematically violating defendants' due process rights by routinely misapplying the state's contemporaneous objection rule in ways that prevent defendants from having their constitutional claims considered. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 20-21 (2010). (describing and documenting this problem).
57. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 55 (2010)
58. Through 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006), Congress granted the federal courts general jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions filed by any prisoner being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
59. See, e.g., Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1088.
60. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1088. Section II.A.1.
61. See, e.g., John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 460-61 (2011)
62. See, e.g., John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 460-61 (2011)
63. See p. 105 ("The Supreme Court should take care not to encourage wasteful habeas litigation over alleged state-specific suspensions of the writ. ")
64. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1088. Section II.A.1 (describing King and Hoffmann's position that only when the inadequacy rises to the level of a federalism crisis is habeas properly invoked).
65. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 53 (2010) Section II.B.2 (documenting a number of inadequacies in state procedural rules).
66. See John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 464 (2011) (noting that this would be "a litigation bonanza for state prisoners").
67. See, e.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997) (analyzing a federal prisoner's claim under § 2241 to avoid the procedural restrictions in § 2255)
68. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that relief is available to a federal prisoner under § 2241 even if § 2255 would have foreclosed relief, because otherwise there would be a "complete miscarriage of justice" (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Sup. Ct. R. 20.4(a).
70. Sup. Ct. R. 20.4(a).
71. See, e.g., In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009).
72. Davis v. Terry, 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010).
73. Cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787 (2011) (granting an original writ petition for the first time in nearly fifty years).
74. See 2 Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 40.3 n.3 (6th ed. 2011) (noting the increase in petitions since AEDPA).
75. See p. 13 (arguing that a flood of worthless petitions "gives habeas a bad name")
76. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) ("He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search. ").
77. Letter from Mark E. Stephens, Dist. Pub. Defender, Knox Cnty. Pub. Defender's Cmty. Law Office, to Honorable Charles Cerny, Presiding Judge, Knox Cnty. Gen. Sessions Court 2 (June 15, 2007), available at http://web.knoxnews.com/pdf/0718stephensletter.pdf.
78. Mark E. Stephens, Dist. Pub. Defender, Knox Cnty. Pub. Defender's Cmty. Law Office, to Honorable Charles Cerny, Presiding Judge, Knox Cnty. Gen. Sessions Court 2 (June 15, 2007) at 4-5.
79. Telephone Interview with Mark E. Stephens, Dist. Pub. Defender, Knox Cnty. Pub. Defender's Cmty. Law Office (July 12, 2011).
80. ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System 5 n.19 (2002), available at http:// www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf (describing these standards).
81. Unfortunately, Knox County, Tennessee is not alone in having extraordinarily high public defender caseloads. ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, GIDEON'S Broken Promise: America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice, A Report on the American Bar Association's Hearings on the Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases 18 (2004).
82. As others note: To have any chance of succeeding, the new federal initiative that Hoffman and King advocate would require, at a minimum, a massive amount of federal money, a commitment by Congress and the President to spend that money on indigent defense, and a willingness on the part of the states to commit their own resources to improving defense representation. None of these ingredients are in good supply.... Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 468 (2011)