Policy divergence in implementation: How conflict among decisive legislators reinforces the effect of agency preferences

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 195-217

  Oosterwaal, Annemarije ^a   Torenvlied, René ^b  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859324111     PISSN: 10531858     EISSN: 14779803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mur037     Document Type: Article

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