Gresham's law in environmental protection

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 103-122

  Yang, Ya Po ^a   Hu, Jin Li ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF KAOHSIUNG   (Taiwan)

^b NATIONAL CHIAO TUNG UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Detection probability; Gresham's law; Incomplete environmental enforcement; Penalties

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859109495     PISSN: 1432847X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10018-011-0025-z     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Andrea M, Giordano M (2006) Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly. Louvain Econ Rev 72: 19-47.
2. Bayer C (2007) Investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit. J Eco Dyn Control 31: 3069-3101.
3. China Economic Net (2008) China has an annual plastic waste amount more than 300 million tons: promoting recycling plastic bags is extremely difficult (in Chinese). http://big5. ce. cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/200801/14/t20080114_14220686. shtml.
4. Chiou JR, Hu JL (2001) Environmental research joint ventures under emission taxes. Environ Resour Econ 20: 129-146.
5. Chua DH, Kennedy PW, Laplante B (1992) Industry structure and compliance with environmental standards. Econ Lett 40: 241-246.
6. Cohen MA (2000) Measuring the costs and benefits of crime and justice. In: Criminal Justice, vol 4. Office of Justice Programs, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington DC, pp 263-315.
7. Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, UK (DEFRA) (2011) Local environmental enforcement-guidance on the use of fixed penalty notices. http://www. defra. gov. uk/publications/2011/03/28/fixed-penalty-guidance-pb12414/.
8. Farzin YH, Akao KI (2007) Environmental quality in a differentiated duopoly. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper. http://www. bepress. com/feem/paper110.
9. Garvie D, Keeler A (1994) Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice. J Public Econ 55: 141-162.
10. Harford JD (1978) Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable standards and taxes. J Environ Econ Manag 5: 26-43.
11. Harford JD (1991) Measurement error and state-dependent pollution control enforcement. J Environ Econ Manag 21: 67-81.
12. Harrington W (1988) Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. J Public Econ 37: 29-53.
13. Helder V (2005) Tacit collusion, cost asymmetries, and mergers. Rand J Econ 36: 39-62.
14. Heyes A (2000) Implementing environmental regulation: enforcement and compliance. J Regul Econ 17: 107-129.
15. Horiuchi E, Ishikawa J (2009) Tariffs and technology transfer through an intermediate product. Rev Int Econ 17: 310-326.
16. Horstmann IJ, Markusen JR (1992) Endogenous market structures in international trade. J Int Econ 32: 109-129.
17. Hu JL, Huang CH, Chu WK (2004) Hierarchical government, bribery, and incomplete environmental enforcement. Environ Econ Policy Stud 6: 177-196.
18. Huang CH (1996) Effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and firm avoidance. Environ Resour Econ 8: 183-204.
19. Jones CA (1989) Standard setting with incomplete enforcement revisited. J Policy Anal Manag 8: 72-87.
20. Kambhu J (1989) Regulatory standards, noncompliance, and enforcement. J Regul Econ 1: 103-114.
21. Keeler AG (1991) Noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets: some extensions. J Environ Econ Manag 21: 180-189.
22. Lear KK, Maxwell JW (1998) The impact of industry structure and penalty policies on incentive for compliance and regulatory enforcement. J Regul Econ 14: 127-148.
23. Malik AS (1990) Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant. J Environ Econ Manag 18: 97-106.
24. Malik AS (1993) Self-reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution. J Environ Econ Manag 24: 241-257.
25. Markusen JR, Morey ER, Olewiler ND (1993) Environmental policy when market structure and plant locations are endogenous. J Environ Econ Manag 24: 69-86.
26. Montero JB (2002) Prices versus quantities with incomplete enforcement. J Public Econ Manag 85: 435-454.
27. Motta M, Norman G (1996) Does economic integration cause foreign direct investment? Int Econ Rev 37: 757-783.
28. People (2007) Institution is the guarantee to promote energy-saving bulbs (in Chinese). http://energy. people. com. cn/BIG5/71894/6199710. html.
29. Piercarlo Z (2006) Differentiated duopoly with asymmetric costs. J Econ Manag Strateg 15: 999-1015.
30. Polinsky AM, Shavell S (2000) The economic theory of public enforcement of law. J Econ Lit 38: 45-76.
31. Segerson K, Tietenberg T (1992) The structure of penalties in environmental enforcement: an economic analysis. J Environ Econ Manag 23: 179-200.
32. Shaffer S (1990) Regulatory compliance with nonlinear penalties. J Regul Econ 2: 99-103.
33. Swierzbsinski JE (1994) Guilty until proven innocent-regulation with costly and limited enforcement. J Environ Econ Manag 27: 127-146.
34. Viscusi WK, Zeckhauser R (1979) Optimal standards with incomplete enforcement. Public Policy 27: 437-456.
35. Xepapadeas AP (1991) Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentive and moral hazard. J Environ Econ Manag 20: 113-126.
36. Zejian On Line (2005) Dismantling used stuffs: recycling or environment-exhausting? (in Chinese). http://www. zjol. com. cn/system/2005/07/27/0_20050727. shtml.