Tacit collusion, cost asymmetries, and mergers

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 39-62

  Vasconcelos, Helder ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21644438542     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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