Bribery, hierarchical government, and incomplete environmental enforcement

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 177-196

  Hu, Jin Li ^a   Huang, Chung Huang ^b   Chu, Wei Kai ^c  

^a NATIONAL CHIAO TUNG UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b NATIONAL TSING HUA UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^c CHINA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Bribery; Corruption; Emission; Enforcement; Revenue sharing

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859104087     PISSN: 1432847X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF03353936     Document Type: Article

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