What is corporation? The corporate personality controversy and the fiduciary principle in corporate governance

Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 243-267

  Iwai, Katsuhito ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84858701018     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203391327     Document Type: Chapter

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