Public goods provision and rural governance in China

China: An International Journal

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 281-298

  Sato, Hiroshi ^a  

^a HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952338677     PISSN: 02197472     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0219747208000174     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. The important turning point for pro-rural policies was a document prepared by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "Guanyu cujin nongmin zengjia shouru ruogan zhengce de yijian" (Commentaries on Policies to Promote the Rapid Increase of Peasant Income), Renmin ribao {People's Daily), 8 Feb. 2004.
2. Regarding the multi-layered structure of local public finance, see Christine Wong (ed.), Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997);
3. Huang Peihua (Christine Wong), Deepak Bhattasali et al., Zhonguo: Guojia fazhan yu difang caizheng (Beijing: Zhongxin chubanshe, 2003).
4. The CHIP Survey has been repeated at different points in time (reference years are 1988, 1995 and 2002) using similar methods and questionnaires under the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. However, the previous surveys did not include an administrative village questionnaire. For details of the sampling framework and sampling method of the CHIP 2002 Survey, see Björn Gustafsson, Li Shi and Terry Sicular (eds.), Inequality and Public Policy in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
5. Concerning the political and economic backgrounds of the rural taxation reform, see Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
6. For the process of tax-for-fee reform, see Ray Yep, "Can 'Tax-for-fee' Reform Reduce Rural Tension in China? The Process, Progress and Limitations", The China Quarterly 177 (2004): 42-70;
7. Hiroshi Sato, Li Shi and Yue Ximing, "Zhongguo nongcun shuifu de zaifenpei xiaoying 1995-2002", Jingji xuebao (Qinghua University) 3 (2006): 153-73, translated as "The Redistributive Impact of Taxation in Rural China, 1995-2002",
8. in Gustafsson, Li and Sicular, Jingji Xuebao (Qinghua University), op. cit.
9. Renmin ribao, 31 Dec. 2005.
10. At the same time, funding arrangements from the central budget for repairs to school buildings and facilities have commenced. Other pro-rural policies such as cooperative medical insurance {hezuo yiliao baoxian) and minimum income schemes {dibao) for rural populations also started in Phase 2. These policies emphasise the role of county governments in funding allocation.
11. China Central Television, Xinwen lianbao, 1 Sept. 2007.
12. As discussed in previous literature, the actual operation of village elections varies from place to place. See, for example, Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One-party State: Introducing Village Elections in China", China Quarterly 162 (2000): 465-89;
13. Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle, "Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-making in Chinese Villages", China Quarterly 162 (2000): 490-512;
14. Yong Xu and Yi Wu (eds.), Xiangtu Zhongguo de minzhu xuanju (Democratic Election in the Chinese Countryside) (Wuhan: Huazhong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2001);
15. Houan Zhang, Yong Xu and Jiquan Xiang (eds.), Zhongguo nongcun cunji zhili (Village Governance in Rural China) (Wuhan: Huazhong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2000).
16. The per capita size of village expenditure in pre-reform villages is larger than in postreform villages. This is because the tax-for-fee reforms were more likely to be launched where the need for reform was higher, that is, where the level of the tax burden was heavier, but where the amount of public service provision was small compared with the level of the tax burden (see Sato, Li and Yue, Zhongguo Nongcun Cunji Zhili, op. cit.).
17. Regarding interregional disparity -regressivity -in peasant burden, see for example, Bernstein and Lu, Zhongguo Nongcun Cunji Zhili, op. cit., pp. 62-3
18. and Sato, Li and Yue, Zhongguo Nongcun Cunji Zhili, op. cit.
19. Xiaobo Zhang, Shenggen Fan, Linxiu Zhang and Jikun Huang, "Local Governance and Public Goods Provision in Rural China", Journal of Public Economics, 88 (2004): 2857-2871 The logit-transformed variable r is defined as In (r/(1 - r).
20. Zhang, Fan, Zhang and Huang, Journal of Public Economics, op. cit.;
21. Renfu Luo, Linxiu Zhang, Jikun Huang, and Scott Rozelle, "Elections, Fiscal Reform and Public Goods Provision in Rural China", in Toward a Harmonious Urban-Rural Relationship (Collections of Papers and Abstracts of Papers), volume II, ed. Beijing Forum 2006 Organising Committee (Beijing: Beijing Forum 2006 Organising Committee, 2006), pp. 200-43;
22. Shuna Wang and Yang Yao, "Grassroots Democracy and Local Governance: Evidence from Rural China", in Toward a Harmonious Urban-Rural Relationship, op. cit., pp. 271-310.
23. Yep, Grassroots democracy and local governance: Evidence from rural China, Toward A Harmonious Urban-Rural Relationship, 271-310, op. cit.;
24. Luo, Zhang, Huang and Rozelle, Grassroots democracy and local governance: Evidence from rural China, Toward A Harmonious Urban-Rural Relationship, 271-310, op. cit.
25. These variables are collected from Caizhengbu yusuansi (the budget planning bureau, Ministry of Finance) (ed.), Quanguo di shi xian caizheng tongji ziliao (Statistics on Public Finance of the Districts, Cities and Counties) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1999-2002). Note that all the county fiscal statistics used here are deflated to 1998 prices using the rural consumer price index at the provincial level. Since several rich regions where county governments do not receive fiscal transfers are excluded, the number of observations of post-reform villages usable for the estimation is 615. See the Appendix for the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation.
26. It should be noted that although the reference year for judging the reform status is 2002, we use county statistics for 2001 as the endpoint because figures for 2002 were not available at the time of writing.
27. As Tsai has emphasised, local public goods provision will be affected by the level of village social capital, as well as local governance. Although we are aware of the significance of informal factors that relate to public goods provision, we will leave this issue for future research. See Lily Lee Tsai, "Solidarity Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China", American Political Science Review 101, no.2 (2007): 355-372
28. See, for example, Sen Lin and Xinbin Ge, "Henan sheng nongcun shuifei gaige hou jiaoyu zhuangkuang fenxi (Education Conditions in Henan Following the Rural Taxation Reform)", Qinghua daxue jingji yanjiu, no.1 (2004).
29. Linda Chelan Li, "Working for the Peasants? Strategic Interactions and Unintended Consequences in Chinese Rural Tax Reform 89-106", China Journal 57 (2007): 89-106.