A probabilistic semantics for counterfactuals. Part A

Review of Symbolic Logic

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 26-84

  Leitgeb, Hannes ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857497030     PISSN: 17550203     EISSN: 17550211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1755020311000153     Document Type: Article

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