ACCEPTANCE AS CONDITIONAL DISPOSITION

Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 29-50

  Paglieri, Fabio ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGIES   (Italy)

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EID: 84857495919     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1515/9783110328851.29     Document Type: Chapter

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