Theories of counter-factual and subjunctive conditionals in contexts of strategic interaction

Research in Economics

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 275-291

  Skyrms, Brian ^a   Bell, Gary D ^a   Woodruff, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Counter factual; Counter theoretical; Hypothetical reasoning; Subjunctive conditional

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347599408     PISSN: 10909443     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/reec.1999.0190     Document Type: Article

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