Buyer groups as strategic commitments

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 470-485

  Dana Jr , James D ^a  

^a NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Buyer alliances; Buyer groups; Buyer power; Coalition formation; Coalition proof equilibria; Horizontal mergers; Strategic commitment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856967538     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.014     Document Type: Article

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