Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 23-47

  Bruttel, Lisa V ^a   Güth, Werner ^b   Kamecke, Ulrich ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^c HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Continuation probability; Experiment; Prisoners' dilemma; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856235500     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0272-z     Document Type: Article

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